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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Child well-being is inextricably linked to the performance of the macroeconomy and 
social sector investments. Although not always explicit, there are very clear and powerful 
channels that need to be understood, monitored and linked to decision-making processes, 
including economic growth, labour markets, price levels, the fiscal balance and government 
spending patterns. As the young and fast-growing population in Eastern and Southern 
Africa explodes from 540 million today to more than a billion in less than 30 years, the 
stakes for children have never been higher. And this is the main objective of the report: 
to review recent and projected macroeconomic and social sector investment trends to 
identify potential threats and opportunities for children so that they prosper during good 
times and are protected during bad times. 
 
The macroeconomy is not working well for most children in the region. Widespread 
poverty is the starting point. More than 40 per cent of the population lives in extreme 
poverty (defined as per capita income of less than US$1.90/day in purchasing power parity, 
2011 international US$). Although this is already high, the figure jumps to four out of every 
five people when applying a more realistic poverty line (e.g. US$5.50/day), indicating that 
most families cannot adequately provide for themselves or their children. And while there 
has been undeniable progress toward improving children’s outcomes in recent decades, 
many basic indicators have simply not kept pace with population growth. The numbers are 
staggering: around a million children under the age of five die from preventable causes 
every year, the majority during the first month of life; more than 27 million children under 
the age of five are stunted; 36 million school-age children are not in school; and close to 
300 million persons – most of whom are children – only have access to surface water and 
other unimproved sources. 
 
Social sector service delivery systems continue to act as a main barrier to faster 
progress in Eastern and Southern Africa. The severe shortage of healthcare personnel 
means that around seven million births occur in dangerous conditions every year. Where 
children are healthy and well-nourished enough to go to school, they often share 
classrooms with 50 or more other pupils. And for the 5 per cent or so of students that 
complete secondary school without unreasonable delay, an even smaller percentage are 
equipped with the level of competencies demanded for jobs in the formal sector. Moreover, 
barely one in ten persons is supported by a social safety net programme. In such a 
context, it is unsurprising that around two in every three children in the region suffer from 
multi-dimensional poverty. 
 
Will macroeconomic forces and social sector investments catalyse sustainable change 
for children – or not? It is hard to be optimistic, but there are many factors that could 
influence the outlook. Let’s start with the downside. 
 
First, economic growth is not nearly fast enough to propel incomes and poverty 
alleviation on a meaningful scale. Once factoring in expected price and demographic 
changes, real per capita GDP growth in Eastern and Southern Africa is projected to be 
around 1.3 per cent in 2019 and 2020, which means that it would take the region around 55 
years to double its income. However, even this is a far cry for the seven the countries 
that are expected to experience negative growth on a real per capita basis during 2019-20. 
Economies must also overcome the continuous drag that rampant income inequality 
inflicts on growth. Given the direct contributions to household income and children’s 
outcomes, the current economic growth trajectory does not bode well for most children 
in the region. 
 
 
Second, labour markets are not providing quality jobs needed by parents and young 
workers to improve their lives and the lives of children. Across the region, around three out 
of four jobs are in the informal sector where pay is generally insufficient to help workers 
and their families escape poverty. At the same time, Eastern and Southern Africa boasts 
one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, which exceeds 20 per cent in many 
southern African countries and leaves far too many families without income. The situation 
is worse for young workers. Six million 15-24 year olds will be unable to find a job in 2019, 
and most of them have already been inflicted by irreversible “wage scars.” At the same 
time, young workers must continue to compete against 12 million new labour market 
entrants each year. 
 
Third, rising prices are negatively influencing real economic growth, government investment 
and household welfare. Eastern and Southern Africa currently suffers some of the highest 
inflation rates in the world, with several countries facing dangerous levels of volatility, 
including Angola, South Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In addition to hampering the real 
output of many economies, rising prices minimize the impact of government budgets, 
including social transfer values and hence direct support to children. At the household 
level, inflation erodes disposable income, while food inflation, which runs substantially 
higher than general inflation across the region, affects the nutritional intake of children, 
whose well-being is further endangered by other coping mechanisms. 
 
Fourth, small revenue bases, continuous budget deficits, high debt and the 
changing official development assistance landscape limit spending on children’s 
services. In most Eastern and Southern African countries, budgets are constrained by the 
small size of formal economies, which makes it impossible to adequately finance services 
for children. As nearly every government is forecast to run a budget deficit in 2019, 
borrowing continues to swell, with debt repayment increasingly crowding out available 
funding for social sectors and debt sustainability concerns reverberating across the 
region. Official development assistance remains an important social sector financing 
source for most governments, but flows are heavily concentrated in a sub-set of 
countries, and eligibility will become increasingly restricted as several countries reach 
middle income status in the near future. 
 
Fifth, the current levels, design and performance of social sector budgets prevent 
systems from delivering the services demanded by children and their families. Few 
governments in the region are meeting their financial commitments to core social sectors, 
either in budget priority or in investment levels. And even where social sectors are 
afforded a large share of the budget, the low revenue base makes it impossible to 
achieve minimum spending levels. Social sector budget structures are also concerning, 
as they commonly favour tertiary services while neglecting the primary services that are 
direly needed and gravely underfunded. Low budget credibility rates, especially for 
capital (or development) items, act as yet another barrier to reaching children. 
 
And now to the upside. 
 
Economic growth could outperform expectations... There are several potential catalysts 
for this. These range from expediting the extraction of unexploited natural resource deposits 
(mainly in Eastern Africa) and higher global commodity prices (to the benefit of resource-
intensive economies) to faster regional economic integration through the African Continental 
FreeTrade Area, an uptick in global demand for products and services from the region, a 
sudden increase in productivity and/or a surge in foreign direct investment flows. Enhancing 
income redistribution efforts through better taxation and social protection measures could 
also lift the incomes of vulnerable households and help engender faster and more 
sustainable growth trajectories. 
 
Labour markets could rapidly expand and create formal sector opportunities for young 
and adult workers… Any of the potential economic growth catalysts would likely improve 
job market prospects. At the same time, new opportunities could be created if service 
sectorjobs more closely accompany the rapidly-growing service sectors that are now 
driving many economies in the region. Efforts to scale up social protection measures 
 could also better protect workers and their families facing unexpected job loss and other 
shocks. 
 
Price levels could permanently stabilize… Overall, the region is already headed down 
a pathway toward lower inflation. The near-term outlook for global commodity prices 
should help limit the forces of cost-push inflation, while the adoption of prudent monetary 
and fiscal policies could usher in a new era of price stability. Adjusting social transfers to 
price indices and evaluating social sector budget allocations in real terms could also 
improve the impact of spending on programmes that benefit vulnerable households and 
children. 
 
New fiscal space opportunities could lead to substantial increases in social sector 
budgets… The introduction of new progressive taxation measures and rapid 
improvements in tax administrative capacity could help unlock domestic revenue 
potential in most countries. Some governments could attract more grants and 
concessional loans if they can convince donors that additional grants and concessional 
loans will be used as intended and deliver strong value for money. Prudent debt 
management and careful risk mitigation could help other governments take better 
advantage of new financiers in the region, including China, to fund social infrastructure. 
All governments also show significant potential to increase the budget priority afforded 
to social services, which could be readily achieved by shifting allocations away from non-
priority sectors, such as defence. And lastly, rapid improvements in the design, credibility 
and execution of social services budgets could bolster actual investment levels and the 
impacts on children’s lives. 
 
The current challenges facing children in the region are astounding in terms of sheer 
numbers, but there is positive momentum to build from. For example, incidence of 
extreme poverty, child mortality and stunting have fallen significantly since 2000, while  the 
rates of school enrollment and access to basic drinking water services are markedly up. 
 
Whether the region can capitalize on the existing momentum depends, first and foremost, 
on promoting macroeconomic strength and predictability. This requires sustained 
economic growth, well-functioning job markets, price stability, and strong domestic 
resource mobilization and debt management capacity. While these outlooks are currently 
lacklustre and marred with uncertainty, sound policies and favorable external conditions 
could help unlock the upside. 
 
Achieving meaningful and lasting improvements in child well-being also requires 
boosting spending on social services. The ongoing population boom has vast potential 
to transform the region – for good or ill – and the outcome will be largely dictated by the 
investment choices of governments today. If budgets strategically prioritize child well-
being, current and forthcoming generations will be healthier, smarter, safer and, ultimately, 
empowered to sustain economic growth and transform living standards and 
opportunities for themselves and their families. The alternative path could prove 
cataclysmic. If government investments fail to adequately prepare their fast-growing labour 
forces, poverty, inequality, crime, violence, social and political instability, out-migration 
and so on are likely to spiral out of control, squandering hope and turning the clock back 
on progress for children, their countries and the region. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Macroeconomics tries to understand the major forces that move an economy. This 
social science analyses the trends, relationships and interactions among a variety of 
economic and financial variables. These range from output (the goods and services 
produced), employment (the size and quality of the labour force and availability of jobs), 
price indices (the changing costs of different items), and interest and exchange rates (the 
cost of borrowing, saving and trading) to consumption, investment and savings (how 
income is used), imports and exports (what is traded across borders), and the fiscal balance 
(how much the government earns, borrows and spends), among many others. 
 
Although not always obvious, the macroeconomy has a very real impact on the 
everyday lives of children. At the individual level, the three most direct channels are 
through jobs, prices and the government budget. 
 
On the jobs front, there is no greater predictor of child well-being than household 
income. In practice, parents who have good jobs can provide much more for their 
children than parents who are unemployed or working in the informal sector with low 
pay and no protections or benefits. At the same time, an expanding labour market 
provides opportunities for graduates and young workers to gain much-needed 
experience as well as to provide for their families. Thus, when the job market is strong, 
children stand to benefit, and vice versa. 
 
 
 
In terms of prices, stability and predictability make it easier for families and governments 
to plan and provide. However, when the costs of meeting basic needs such as food, water, 
transport and medicine continuously rise, households can afford less with their incomes 
and any available savings. The same logic applies to government budgets. When prices 
go up, the impacts of services diminish, as it becomes costlier to maintain the same level 
and quality. 
 
Lastly, a significant portion of government spending supports children both directly and 
indirectly. This includes providing them with primary health and education services, 
ensuring that they have enough food to eat and access to clean drinking water and safe 
places to go to the toilet, as well as supporting their families with cash and other social 
safety net benefits to supplement income or help transitions through difficult times. 
Children also benefit indirectly from other government spending programmes, such as 
public housing, infrastructure (transportation networks, electrical grids and so on) and 
agriculture (availability of food and family income). While such benefits increase during 
good times, they are often the first to be cut during bad times, especially essential 
social services. This was one of the key findings of UNICEF’s landmark work, 
Adjustment with a Human Face1 which tracked the impacts of macroeconomic crises in 
developing regions during the 1980s. 
Economic growth, in turn, affects everything. Healthy or fast-growing economies create 
new jobs, require prudent monetary and fiscal policies that minimize price volatility, and 
generate more government revenue. In contrast, slow growth or recessionary periods 
pressure labour markets, often become breeding grounds for rampant inflation 
 
 
1 Cornia, G., Jolly, R., and Stewart, F. (1987). Adjustment with a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting 
Growth. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 and reduce government revenue. As illustrated in Figure 1.01, these macroeconomic 
variables directly affect households and ultimately children through income, living costs 
and the availability of social services. Figure 1.02 then depicts the implications of the 
performance of the same set of macroeconomic variables on child well-being, both 
positive and negative. 
 
In a context of pervasive poverty and young and fast-growing populations, macroeconomic 
volatility can have life and death consequences for children. This is the current state of 
the Eastern and Southern Africa region (ESAR). The latest estimates indicate that two out 
of every three children in the region experience multi-dimensional poverty, on average.2 
 
 
2 Based on the latest child poverty reports produced by UNICEF in ESAR; additional details are provided in Chapter 2. 
 
Figure 1.01. Transmission channels of select macroeconomic 
variables to households and children 
 
 
Figure 1.02. The impact of select macroeconomic variables on child well-being 
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This means that most children do not have access to basic things like primary healthcare 
services, clean drinking water or safe housing conditions, while they may be further 
affected by malnutrition, emotional and physical abuse, or having to work to contribute to 
household income. The compounding effects exacerbate their realities. At the same time, 
around half of the 540 million inhabitants are under the age of 18, with the total population 
expected to reach one billion persons in less than 30 years.3 
 
In short, the stakes for children in ESAR have never been higher. And this is the main 
objective of the report: to review recent and projected macroeconomic and social sector 
investment trends to identify potential threats and opportunities for children so that they 
prosper during good times and are protected during bad times. 
 
The structure of the report is as follows. Chapter 2, “The Demographic, Economic and 
Social Context,” sets the stage by providing an overview of the ongoing population 
dynamics as well as the current state of poverty, social development and fragility across 
the region. Each of the subsequent chapters then explores the recent performance and 
forecasted trends of a specific macroeconomic variable. Most of the content of each 
chapter is devoted to understanding and dissecting the broader issue; this is then followed 
by shorter summaries of the main trends along with the implications and risks for children 
and their families. The macroeconomic topics covered are: 
o Economic growth (Chapter 3) 
 
o Employment (Chapter 4) 
 
o Inflation (Chapter 5) 
 
o The fiscal balance (government expenditure, income and debt) (Chapter 6) 
 
Given the critical importance of how the national budget is transformed into goods and 
services that benefit children, Chapter 7 unpacks social sector investment trends. Here, 
the report takes a close look at the budget priority given to health, education, water and 
sanitation, and social protection, the overall level of investment in these areas, and the 
design and performance of their budgets. To conclude, Chapter 8 summarizes the main 
findings. 
 
This report is also complemented by a summary note. In addition to recapping the key 
highlights of the full report, the companion document presents suggested actions for 
UNICEF country offices to protect and promote child well-being in response to different 
macroeconomic and social sector investment situations. Readers can either peruse the 
entire menu of actions or go directly to a topic of interest. It is hoped that this resource can 
contribute to more timely and effective programming across all of UNICEF’s work areas. 
 
Three caveats need to be mentioned. First, this report does not review the complete set of 
macroeconomic variables (savings rates, interest rates, asset prices, international trade, 
etc.) but rather focuses on those that have the most direct impact on child well-being. 
Second, the analyses are based on international data sources, which may differ from 
official government figures. This was intentional to allow for cross-country comparisons 
and regional aggregations, which would not otherwise be possible. In exceptional cases 
where global databases do not provide key information, such as on the composition and 
performance of social sector budgets, the report draws on information from recent public 
finance analyses at country level. And third, the sample is restricted to the 21 countries that 
form ESAR4 and excludes those in Central, Western and Northern Africa. 
 
3 Based on United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) World Population Prospects: 2017 
Revision (medium variant estimates). 
4 These are: Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2. 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 
 
 
This chapter examines the demographic, economic and social context of ESAR to offer a 
general picture of the state of child well-being. It starts by describing the ongoing population 
boom, which poses immense challenges and opportunities for both current and future 
generations. It then turns to income and poverty trends to highlight key disparities across 
the region as well as the difficulties that many households face in effectively providing for 
children. The chapter next reviews the recent performance of basic social sector indicators 
and coverage rates – including for health; human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) / acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS); education; water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); 
and social assistance – to better gauge the primary challenges facing children and their 
families. This is followed by a snapshot of the latest multi-dimensional child poverty 
situation The chapter then discusses the state of fragility, which often impedes government 
efforts to prioritize children’s needs, before concluding with a summary of key trends and 
the implications for children. 
 
2.1 Population 
 
ESAR is experiencing unprecedented population growth: its population will nearly double 
in less than 30 years, with particularly heavy pressures in urban areas. It is projected that 
the total population of the region is more than 540 million in 2019 and that it will surpass 
the one billion threshold around 2047 (Figure 2.01). In 2019, nearly 260 million residents 
of the region are under the age of 18, amounting to just under half the total population: 
this figure will approach 400 million by 2050. Location is another important dimension of 
the demographic forces that are shaping the region. While just under one in three persons 
in ESAR reside in urban areas today, the proportion will reach around one in two by 2050 
(see also Figure 2.01 – dark blue dotted line). Moreover, while the region accounts for 
only 7 per cent of the global population in 2019,5 close to one in five persons will reside in 
ESAR by the turn of the century, increasing both its geo-political and economic standing 
in the world. As The Economist noted in a special briefing in March 2019, this change is 
already underway in the “new scramble for Africa,” with more than 320 new embassies or 
consulates opened across the continent between 2010 and 2016.6 
 
Several countries are likely to experience jaw-dropping population surges. For example, 
between 2019 and 2100, populations are expected to increase by factors of five or more 
in Angola, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia (Figure 2.02). With its 
population currently growing at 3.1 per cent per year, the United Republic of Tanzania is 
set to become the largest in the region, with its 60 million population today projected to 
exceed 300 million just before 2100. South Africa, in contrast, currently boasts the third 
largest population in ESAR, but its low population growth rate (1.2 per cent) means that it 
will likely only be the tenth most populous country in the region by 2100. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Author’s calculations based on UN DESA World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision (medium variant estimates). 
6 The Economist (2019). A Sub-Saharan Seduction: Africa is Attracting Ever More Interest from Powers Elsewhere – They 
are Following Where China Led. 9 March edition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2.01. Child and adult population projections in ESAR, 
1950-2100 (in millions and as % of total by location) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on UN DESA World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision and UN DESA World Urbanization Prospects: 
2014 Revision (medium variant estimates for both). 
Note: Rural and urban projections are only available through 2050. 
 
 
Figure 2.02. Population projections in ESAR countries, 2019, 2050 and 2100 (in millions) 
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Source: UN DESA World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision (medium variant estimates). 
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The obvious impact of fast-growing populations is many more children and adolescents. 
It is projected that 655 million babies will be born in ESAR between 2019 and 2050, 
amounting to more than 20 million new lives each year or close to 50,000 births a day 
(Figure 2.03). Subsequent life cycle age groups will also grow significantly. Over the same 
period, around 17 million children in the region will enter adolescence every year, with a 
total of more than 500 million new adolescents over the next thirty years.7 
 
The current population structure further confirms that the region is in the middle of a 
demographic transition. As fertility rates continue to fall and life expectancy rises, countries 
– and the region as a whole – are presented with a one-time opportunity to benefit from the 
“demographic dividend,” whereby the size of the economically-active population increases 
relative to the size of the population that is not working (or dependent). Mathematically, 
this phenomenon is captured by the dependency ratio, which measures the relationship 
between workers (aged 15-64) and non-workers (those persons under 15 and over 65) in 
the population. In the 1980s, for instance, approximately 95 persons “depended” or relied 
on the income of every 100 working-aged persons in the population (Figure 2.04). However, 
since peaking around 1987, this relationship has steadily reversed as the number of workers 
in the population increases faster than the numbers of young and old persons. In 2000, 
there were around 90 dependents for every 100 working-aged bodies in ESAR; the figure is 
estimated at around 79 in 2019 and forecast to fall below 60 by 2048. From that point, the 
overall balance between workers and non-workers in the population is expected to roughly 
remain in equilibrium before reversing in the 2070s, when the income from fewer and fewer 
workers will need to support more and more dependent persons. 
 
It is important to recognize that the demographic dividend is only the theoretical 
potential that countries can achieve. Exploiting the potential benefits largely depends on 
achieving three broad policy objectives.8 The first is to increase the size of the working-age 
population by improving child health, strengthening female education and gender equity, 
addressing social norms on fertility, reducing child marriage and expanding family planning 
programmes. The second is to maximize economic output by improving education and human 
capital, attracting foreign direct investments, strengthening the business environment and 
international trade, and encouraging female employment outside the home. And the third is 
to increase domestic savings and investment by promoting life expectancy and expanding 
financial access. Virtually all the “hows” are inextricably linked to government investments – 
how much and how well they spend on different priority programmes to foster the 
demographic dividend, which is the focus of Chapter 7. 
 
 
 
7 Author’s calculations based on UN DESA World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision (medium variant estimates). 
8 Canning, D., Raja, S. and Yazbeck, A. (2015). Africa’s Demographic Transition: Dividend or Disaster? Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
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Figure 2.03. Number of children aged 0-11 months in ESAR, 1950-2100 (in millions) 
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Source: UN DESA World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision (medium variant estimates). 
 
 
Figure 2.04. Dependency ratio in ESAR, 1950-2100 (population weighted regional average, as %) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on UN DESA World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision (medium variant estimates). 
Note: The dependency ratio is calculated by adding the child population (14 and under) and elderly population (65 and over) and dividing 
the total by the working age population (15-64). 
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2.2 Income and poverty 
 
ESAR predominantly consists of low income countries (LICs). Under the World Bank’s income 
classification system,9 12 of the 21 countries in the region are LICs, with per capita gross 
national income (GNI) of US$995 or less based on data available in 2017. Of the remaining 
countries, five are lower-middle income countries (LMICs) and three are upper-middle income 
countries (UMICs) – Botswana, Namibia and South Africa (Figure 2.05). Over the past five 
years, two countries have been re-classified: Angola fell from an UMIC to a LMIC in 2017, while 
Kenya graduated from a LIC to a LMIC in 2015. South Sudan is another interesting case, as the 
country vacillated between LIC and LMIC status following independence in 2011 but has 
remained a LIC since 2016 mainly due to the protracted conflict. As an average, per capita 
income in the region is projected to be around US$2,000 in 2019, which ranges from less than 
US$250 in South Sudan to more than US$8,250 in Botswana (see also Figure 2.05). 
 
The low levels of incomes observed in most ESAR countries lead to very high rates of 
extreme poverty irrespective of definitions. Based on the latest available estimates for 
each country, 43 per cent of ESAR’s population lives in extreme monetary poverty, on 
average, which is below the international poverty line of US$1.90/day (in PPP, 2011 
international US$) (Figure 2.06). Poverty rates range from 13 per cent in Namibia to 78 
per cent in Madagascar. If applying a higher determinant of monetary poverty, 65 per 
cent of the population lives on less than US$3.20/day (in PPP, 2011 international US$), 
on average, with more than 80 per cent below a threshold at US$5.50/day. In contrast, 
 
9 World Bank (2019). World Bank Country and Lending Groups: Fiscal Year 2018-19. Note: The World Bank’s method for 
classifying countries is based on converting the latest available GNI estimates to per capita current US$ using the Atlas 
Method, which applies a three-year moving average to adjust for exchange rate and price volatility. Updated income 
thresholds and country categories are released on 1 July every year. As a result, the current country classifications are not 
perfectly aligned to the IMF’s GDP per capita estimates for 2019 as presented in Figure 2.05 (e.g. the case of Zimbabwe). 
 
Figure 2.05. GDP per capita and income classification in 
ESAR countries, 2019 (in per capita US$) 
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
Notes: See footnote 9 for description of why the IMF projections and the World Bank official income classifications       
do not always correspond; data unavailable for Somalia. 
  
 
Figure 2.06. Monetary poverty headcount ratios according to different thresholds in 
ESAR countries, 2016 or latest available (as % of the population) 
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Sources: World Bank Global Poverty Working Group for data on national poverty lines and World Bank Development 
Research Group for data on international poverty lines. 
Note: Data unavailable for Eritrea and Somalia. 
 
if using official national poverty lines approximately 47 per cent of ESAR’s population is 
considered income poor, on average. Interestingly, when comparing national lines to the 
standard US$1.90/day international line, 11 out of 19 countries see their poverty rates fall 
by more than 10 per cent. On the other side, national poverty lines are more than 20 per 
cent higher than the international line in Comoros and Eswatini, nearly 40 per cent higher 
in South Africa and South Sudan, and 50 per cent higher in Zimbabwe. 
 
2.3 Social development 
 
2.3.1. Child health and nutrition 
 
The region has made impressive strides in improving the health outcomes of children in 
recent decades. The under-five mortality rate, which is one of the most basic health indicators, 
marked significant progress in the region between 2000 and 2017, falling from an average of 
134 deaths per 1,000 live births to 60 per 1,000 – or a 55 per cent improvement (Figure 2.07). 
In Angola, Malawi, Rwanda and Zambia, the number of under-five deaths plummeted by 105 
or more per every 1,000 live births, among the fastest progress in the world over that period. 
Although not as strong, the neonatal mortality rate also advanced, from 36 deaths per 1,000 
live births to 24, on average – or a 33 per cent enhancement – with Angola, Ethiopia and 
Rwanda ranking among the best performers globally (see also Figure 2.07). 
 
However, the burden of newborn deaths has stagnated, while the number of preventable 
deaths remains high. A key trend is that the reduction in under-five mortality rates has been 
accompanied by an increase in the proportion of newborn deaths. While 27 per cent of under-
five deaths occurred in the first 27 days of life in 2000, on average, this climbed 
  
  
 
 
Figure 2.07. Neonatal and under-five mortality trends in ESAR countries, 2017 (per 1,000 
live births and as # of deaths among children 0-27 days and 28 days to 4 years old) 
 
200,000 
180,000 
160,000 
140,000 
120,000 
100,000 
80,000 
60,000 
40,000 
20,000 
- 
140 
 
120 
 
100 
 
80 
 
60 
 
40 
 
20 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
# of deaths (0-27 days) # of deaths (28 days-4 years) 
 
Source: United Nations Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (median bounds) (September 2018 update). 
 
 
Figure 2.08. Trends in births unattended by skilled health professionals in ESAR, 2000-
16 (in # and as % of total births, population weighted regional average) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on UNICEF’s State of the World’s Children, Childinfo and Demographic and Health Surveys for data on 
birth attendance, and UN DESA World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision (medium variant estimates) for data on annual births. 
Note: Interpolation and nearest neighbour imputation methods used to fill missing values. 
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 to more than 40 per cent as of 2017, which is likely driven by the increasing number of 
births. At the same time, the latest estimates show that there are nearly 1 million under- 
five deaths occurring in the region every year. Large child populations in several countries 
is a key factor. For example, despite outperforming the regional average, the under-five 
mortality rate of 59 per 1,000 live births in Ethiopia equated to around 190,000 under-five 
deaths in 2017, or nearly 20 per cent of the regional total. Similarly, Uganda’s rate of 54 per 
1,000 live births translated into nearly 115,000 child deaths. Even in South Africa, which 
has the lowest under-five mortality rate in ESAR (37 per 1,000 live births), some 43,000 
child deaths were projected in 2017. Elsewhere, the region continues to deal with some of 
the highest mortality rates in the world, including in Angola (81 under-five deaths per 1,000 
live births), Lesotho (86), South Sudan (96) and Somalia (127). 
 
One key health challenge facing many children in the region is that they arrive in dangerous 
conditions. Looking at changes over time, the total number of deliveries that took place 
without the support of a skilled professional in ESAR remained virtually unchanged between 
2000 and 2015, at around 7 million (Figure 2.08). According to the latest estimates from 2016, 
more than 40 per cent of all deliveries in the region occurred outside health facilities and 
without the support of trained health professionals, exposing very large numbers of both 
mothers and newborns to life-threatening risks. 
 
The limited progress on birth attendance is largely a symptom of the broader human 
resource shortages affecting most healthcare systems in the region. Available data on 
healthcare professionals indicate that there is approximately one doctor available for every 
20,000 persons and one nurse or midwife for every 2,350 persons as regional averages 
(Figure 2.09). The UMICs in the region – Botswana, Namibia and South Africa – have 
significantly higher health workforce densities, with a physician available for every 2,500 
persons and a nurse or midwife for every 300 persons, on average. However, on the other 
side, Burundi, Ethiopia and the United Republic of Tanzania have a meagre 0.024 physicians 
per 1,000 population, on average, equating to one doctor for more than 40,000 persons; in 
Malawi, this figure soars beyond 55,000 persons. 
 
 
Figure 2.09. Population attended by healthcare professionals in ESAR countries, 2016 or 
latest available (in average number of persons served by a doctor and nurse/midwife) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on World Health Organization (WHO) Global Health Workforce Statistics (December 2018 update). 
Note: Data unavailable for South Sudan. 
  
  
  
 
    
 
 
Figure 2.10. Prevalence of stunting (height for age) in ESAR countries, 
2016 or latest available (as % and # of children under 5 affected) 
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Source: UNICEF, WHO and World Bank Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates (2018 edition). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11. Prevalence of HIV in high-burden ESAR countries, 
2017 (as % and number of 0-14 and 15-49 year olds) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on UNAIDS modelled estimates (2018) and UN DESA World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision 
(medium variant estimates). 
Note: Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea, Madagascar, Somalia and South Sudan are not presented since they are not among UNAIDS’ fast-track 
strategy to end the AIDS epidemic by 2030. 
6 million 
  
 The high prevalence of stunting also highlights serious challenges in addressing child 
nutrition in ESAR. A review of the latest estimates indicates that 35 per cent of all 
children under five were stunted, on average (Figure 2.10). As a regional total, this 
equates to more than 27 million children. Stunting affected 40 per cent or more of 
children under five in Mozambique and Zambia, and more than half of children in 
Burundi and Eritrea. 
 
 
2.3.2. HIV/AIDS 
 
The HIV epidemic continues to adversely affect health outcomes, especially in 
southern Africa. In 2017, the average incidence of HIV among those aged 15 to 49 in high-
burden countries in ESAR was estimated at 11.5 per cent, while just over 1 per cent of 
children aged 0-14 were affected (Figure 2.11). In aggregate terms, 15.8 million adults and 
1.1 million children in high burden countries were living with HIV. Southern Africa remains 
particularly hard hit, with prevalence rates among the 15-49 population around 12 per cent 
in Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, close to 20 per cent in South Africa, 23 
per cent in Botswana and Lesotho, and more than 27 per cent in Eswatini. South Africa 
hosts the largest number of persons living with HIV, including nearly 300,000 0-14 year 
olds and 6 million 15-49 year olds. With around 170,000 0-14 year olds living with HIV, 
Mozambique also has a large number of affected children, with Kenya, Uganda and the 
United Republic of Tanzania not far behind (110,000, on average). 
 
Despite the high numbers of children living with HIV, close to half remain without 
access to life-saving antiretroviral therapy (ART). The latest figures indicate that around 
60 per cent of children living with HIV in high-burden countries were receiving ART 
 
 
Figure 2.12. Children living with HIV receiving ART in high-burden 
ESAR countries, 2017 (as % and # of affected children 0-14) 
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Source: Global AIDS Response Progress Report (2018) and UNAIDS modelled estimates (2018). 
Note: Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea, Madagascar, Somalia and South Sudan are not presented since they are not among UNAIDS’ fast-
track strategy to end the AIDS epidemic by 2030. 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
Figure 2.13. Out-of-school children, adolescents and youth of primary, lower 
secondary and upper secondary school age in ESAR countries, 2017 or latest 
available (in thousands and as % of total school age population) 
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Source: Global AIDS Response Progress Report (2018) and UNAIDS modelled estimates (2018). 
Note: Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea, Madagascar, Somalia and South Sudan are not presented since they are not among UNAIDS’ fast-
track strategy to end the AIDS epidemic by 2030. 
 
 
Figure 2.14. Pupil-teacher ratios by level of education in ESAR countries, 2017 or latest available 
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Note: Data unavailable for one or more levels in Mozambique, Somalia and Zambia. 
   
 
    
 
   
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
          
                       
                       
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
      
        
 
               
 
 
                      
 
 (Figure 2.12). Coverage rates ranged from less than 15 per cent in Angola to nearly 90 
per cent in Zimbabwe. South Africa has the largest number of persons living with HIV in 
the world, but also the biggest treatment programme, which accounts for around 20 per 
cent of ART coverage globally. Despite the strong efforts, the 58 per cent coverage rate 
for children 0-14 still means that almost 120,000 were without access in 2017. 
 
 
2.3.3. Education 
 
The region has made strong progress towards getting children into school, but much 
remains to be done. The latest available country estimates indicate that more than 36 
million children, adolescents and youth of school age were recently not attending 
school in ESAR, which is somewhere around one in three in total (Figure 2.13). This 
includes approximately 12.1 million primary school age children, along with 11.6 and 
13.5 million lower and upper secondary school age adolescents and youth respectively. 
The largest concentrations were in Ethiopia and the United Republic of Tanzania, at 7.5 
and 10.1 million respectively, while Angola, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique and South 
Sudan each recently had between 2 and 2.6 million out-of-school children, adolescents 
and youth. In terms of incidence across all levels of education, this fluctuates from less 
than 20 per cent of the school-age population in Botswana, Malawi, Namibia and South 
Africa to more than 60 per cent in Eritrea and South Sudan. 
 
Of the children that are in school in ESAR, many are learning in overcrowded classrooms. 
On average, there are around 33 students for every teacher at pre-primary level, 41 at 
primary level and 27 at secondary level (Figure 2.14). There is, of course, significant 
variation across countries and levels of education. For instance, the pupil-teacher ratio 
in pre-primary education ranges from 12:1 in Botswana to 114:1 in the United Republic 
of Tanzania or, in primary education, from 19:1 in Comoros to 62:1 in Malawi. 
 
The challenge of providing quality learning opportunities for all children is further 
heightened by low completion rates, which become progressively worse at higher 
levels of education. The latest estimates for the region show that approximately 60 per 
cent of children enter and finish primary school without excessive delays, which falls to 
around 40 per cent at lower secondary level and 20 per cent at upper secondary level 
(Figure 2.15). Low completion rates can indicate a variety of challenges, from late entry 
to high drop-out and repetition rates, but in most countries they are a symptom of 
inadequate learning environments. To illustrate the overall impact of the broader 
knowledge deficit, applying the regional average completion rates would imply that for 
every 100 students that enter primary school, just 5 would graduate from secondary 
school in a timely manner.10 
 
Completing a grade level does not mean that students have acquired the right level 
of competencies, which is another challenge facing education systems in the region. 
The Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality 
(SEACMEQ) periodically tests the reading and mathematics ability of Grade 6 students in 
its member countries (includes 12 in ESAR plus Zanzibar) to show how each country 
performs in children’s learning outcomes and enable cross-country comparison. The 
country scores are presented as the mean scores achieved by pupils taking the exam and 
evaluated against the SEACMEQ standardized mean of 500. While the latest round 
(SEACMEQ IV Project) was implemented in 2012-14, the results were not available at the 
time of publication. Turning to the SEACMEQ III Project, which was finalized in 2011, at 
least seven ESAR countries performed well below the standard score in both 
 
10 This is a very crude estimate. Of the 100 students that enter primary school, 63 would finish in a timely manner and move 
on to lower secondary school. Of those students, 38 per cent (or approximately 24) would continue to upper secondary level. 
And of those students, 20 per cent (or about 5) would graduate from secondary school in a timely manner. 
  
 
 
Figure 2.15. Completion rates by level of education in ESAR countries, 2017 or latest 
available (as % of a cohort of children aged 3-5 years above the intended age for the last 
grade of each level of education who have completed that grade) 
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Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics. 
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Note: Data unavailable for Botswana, Eritrea and Somalia. 
 
 
                Figure 2.16. SEACMEQ III scores in ESAR countries (mean score achieved by pupils taking the exam) 
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Source: SEACMEQ III (available at: http://www.sacmeq.org/ReadingMathScores). 
Note: SEACMEQ does not include Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Rwanda, Somalia and South Sudan. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
subject matters, indicating that most Grade 6 students in those countries have acquired 
functional literacy and numeracy knowledge well below the regional average (Figure 
2.16). In addition to the large variance in the region, the scores within countries show 
very uneven performance across geographic regions and income groups, validating 
the universality of the learning crisis.11 
 
 
2.3.4. WASH 
 
WASH indicators have improved over time in ESAR but have not kept pace with 
population growth. With regard to open defecation, the percentage of persons 
practising fell from 38 to 20 per cent between 2000 and 2015 across the entire ESAR 
population, yet 100 million persons recently continued such practices, which occurred 
almost exclusively in rural areas (Figure 2.17). In terms of access to improved water 
sources, there was an increase of eight percentage points (from 34 to 42 per cent) 
between 2000 and 2015; however, an astounding 284 million persons continued to 
only have access to surface water and other unimproved sources according to the 
latest estimates (Figure 2.18). The sanitation situation is equally concerning. While the 
percentage of persons in ESAR with access to an improved sanitation facility steadily 
declined from 75 per cent in 2000 to 68 per cent in 2015, the number of persons without 
access almost doubled (from 89 million to 164 million) over the same period (Figure 
2.19). 
 
11 Spaull, N. (2011). Primary School Performance in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. SACMEQ III 
Working Paper. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.17. Open defecation trends in ESAR by area, 2000-15 
(in # and % of persons practising – population weighted regional average) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation (2017) and UN 
DESA World Urbanization Prospects: 2014 Revision (medium variant estimates). 
Note: Missing values for Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan were projected using least squares regression method. 
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Figure 2.18. Trends in access to an improved water source in ESAR by area, 
2000-15 (in # of persons without access and % of population with access 
– population weighted regional average) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation (2017) and UN DESA 
World Urbanization Prospects: 2014 Revision (medium variant estimates). 
Note: Missing values for Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan were projected using least squares regression method. 
 
 
Figure 2.19. Trends in access to an improved sanitation facility in ESAR by area, 
2000-15 (in # of persons without access and % of population with access 
– population weighted regional average) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation (2017) and UN DESA 
World Urbanization Prospects: 2014 Revision (medium variant estimates). 
Note: Missing values for Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan were projected using least squares regression method. 
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 2.3.5. Social assistance 
 
Coverage of government-led social assistance programmes has increased considerably 
in recent years across the region, but systems still provide limited support for the most 
vulnerable populations, including children. Based on the latest available estimates, social 
protection and labour market programmes covered less than a quarter of the populations 
in ESAR countries, on average (Figure 2.20). Even in a scenario of perfect poverty targeting 
and assuming no overlap of beneficiaries between programmes, around half of poor 
persons received no support at all, on average (23 per cent coverage rates compared to 
46 per cent poverty rates). Some of the higher income countries, like Botswana, Eswatini 
and South Africa, have managed to achieve higher coverage rates, arriving close to or 
exceeding the percentage of poor according to national definitions, again assuming 
programme beneficiaries were universally poor. However, it should be noted that some 
social assistance programmes do not specifically target the poor, but have broader 
objectives, such as universal old-age pensions or meals or scholarships for all students. 
 
Patchy social assistance coverage also threatens to stall progress towards eradicating 
poverty. Based on analysis presented in a World Bank review of safety nets in Africa, only 
around 14 per cent of the populations in ESAR countries have been supported by at least 
one social assistance programme in recent years, on average (Figure 2.21). Coverage rates 
across countries are uneven, ranging from 4 per cent or less in Angola, Comoros, Eswatini, 
Madagascar, Somalia, Uganda and Zimbabwe to around 40 per cent in Botswana and 
Namibia and above 60 per cent in South Africa. 
Nonetheless, children are more likely to benefit from social assistance than the population 
at large. Most social assistance programmes in the region are directly or indirectly targeted 
 
 
Figure 2.20. Social protection and labour market coverage and poverty rates in ESAR 
countries, 2014 or latest available (as % of the population covered and nationally 
defined as poor) 
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Sources: World Bank. The Atlas of Social Protection: Indicators of Resilience and Equity (ASPIRE) for data on social protection and labour 
market programmes and World Bank, Global Poverty Working Group for Poverty for data on headcount ratios at national poverty lines. 
Note: Data unavailable for Angola, Burundi, Eritrea and Somalia. 
  
 
 
Figure 2.21. Coverage of at least one social safety net programme in 
ESAR countries, latest available (as a % of total population) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Beegle, K., et al. (2018). Realizing the Full Potential of Social Safety Nets in Africa. World Bank, pp. 320-323. 
Notes: Data unavailable for Eritrea; the overall coverage rate is approximated by summing up the number of direct and indirect beneficiaries 
of cash transfers, food-based transfers and public works programmes only – beneficiaries from other programmes are excluded to avoid 
overestimation (see appendices B.2 and B.3 in the above report for complete details on the methodology). 
 
Figure 2.22. Proportion of children covered by some type of social assistance benefit in 
ESAR countries, latest available three-year average (as a % of children under 14) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Beegle, K. et al. (2018). Realizing the Full Potential of Social Safety Nets in Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank, pp. 320-323. 
Note: Data unavailable for Comoros, Eritrea, Rwanda and Somalia; see appendices B.2 and B.3 in the above report for complete details 
on the methodology. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
   
    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
  
 
Box 2.1. Human development trends in ESAR 
 
 
 
Figure 2.23. Human Development Index values in ESAR, 2017 
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Source: UNDP Human Development Index (available at: http://hdr.undp.org). 
Note: Data unavailable for Somalia. 
* Denotes countries with the highest and lowest HDI values in the world. 
 
Levels of human development vary widely across the region but are very low compared to global averages. 
The Human Development Index (HDI) gives a good overview of countries’ progress on economic and 
social issues. The index is a summary measure of average achievement in three core dimensions of human 
development: (i) a long and healthy life (based on life expectancy); (ii) being knowledgeable (based on 
years of schooling for adults over 25 and expected years of schooling for children entering school age); 
and (iii) having a decent standard of living (based on GNI per capita). On average, ESAR countries scored 
0.55 in the latest HDI, significantly below the global average of 0.70. In terms of outliers, Botswana and 
South Africa rank the highest (0.72 and 0.70, respectively) while South Sudan and Burundi have the lowest 
scores (0.39 and 0.42 respectively) (Figure 2.23). However, of the 189 countries measured globally in 2017, 
Botswana ranks 101 and South Sudan 187. In addition to highlighting the extreme variance within ESAR, 
this also shows that even the best performing countries require significant improvements to catch up with 
global human development leaders. 
  
  
  
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
to children because they often support households with children.12 Again looking at the latest 
analysis from the World Bank, coverage of children aged 0-14 in ESAR is estimated at 25 per 
cent, on average, which is more than ten percentage points higher than the rate for the 
overall population (Figure 2.22). Most countries in southern Africa demonstrate very high 
coverage rates at close to or above 60 per cent, while less than 5 per cent of children recently 
received support in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe. 
 
 
2.4 Multi-dimensional child poverty 
 
The limited access to basic social services as just described means that most children in ESAR 
suffer from the compounding effects of multi-dimensional poverty. Multiple Overlapping 
Deprivation Analysis (MODA) is a methodology developed and applied by UNICEF to measure 
the number of deprivations experienced by an individual child based on her or his access to 
health, education, water, sanitation and other necessary services and conditions. A review of 
the latest reports indicates that an average of 61 per cent of children in ESAR suffer from multi- 
dimensional poverty (Figure 2.24 – red circles). The rate ranges from 39 per cent in Rwanda to 
90 per cent in South Sudan. In terms of aggregate numbers, a back-of-the-envelope estimate 
places the number of children under 18 in the region that suffer from multiple deprivations 
somewhere between 155 and 165 million children in 2019.13 It is also important to note that 
Ethiopia and the United Republic of Tanzania, the two most populous countries in the region, 
are among those with the highest rates of multi-dimensional child poverty. 
 
 
12 Beegle, K., et al. (2018). Realizing the Full Potential of Social Safety Nets in Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Chapter 1. 
13 This crude estimate is arrived at by multiplying the most recent multi-dimensional child poverty rate for each country by 
its projected under-18 population in 2019 based on UN DESA World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision (medium variant). 
 
Figure 2.24. Multi-dimensional and monetary child poverty rates in ESAR 
countries, 2018 or latest available (as % of the 0-17 population) 
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Sources: Latest child poverty reports for all countries (available at: https://www.unicef.org/esa/reports/child-poverty-analysis, except for 
South Sudan, which is based on the global multi-dimensional poverty index produced by Oxford Poverty and Human Development 
Initiative. 
 Rates of non-monetary poverty among children are almost always higher than monetary 
poverty and have distinct implications. Based on the available sample, non-monetary 
poverty is about 16 per cent higher, on average, in ESAR (see also Figure 24 – blue bars).14 
Importantly, child deprivations are not always closely related to the existence of monetary 
poverty. This means that multi-dimensional analytical approaches, such as MODA, can 
uncover critical aspects of child poverty that may not be captured in regular government 
poverty monitoring, and can provide critical inputs to plans and budgets, especially on 
cross-sectoral issues. 
 
2.5 Fragility 
 
A third of countries in ESAR are in fragile situations, with most others facing high risks. In 
its latest list in July 2018, the World Bank rated Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea, Mozambique, 
Somalia, South Sudan and Zimbabwe as countries in fragile situations.15 However, this 
classification only considers two very basic factors: the country’s policy and institutional 
framework16 and the presence of a peace-building mission. To better understand the main 
risks, the Fragility Framework developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) assesses a country’s potential exposure to negative outcomes 
 
14 By definition, multi-dimensional child poverty rates should always be higher than monetary child poverty rates. However, 
in the absence of a universal cutoff value (e.g. any child suffering from two or more deprivations should be considered multi- 
dimensionally poor), many governments in ESAR selected a higher number of deprivations (e.g. 3 or 4) to determine which 
children are considered multi-dimensionally poor, which lowers the official rate and pushes it below monetary poverty rates 
in some places. 
15 World Bank (2018). Harmonized List of Fragile Situation Fiscal Year 2019. 
16 This is determined by a country’s score on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which the World 
Bank conducts every year to evaluate the conduciveness of a country’s policy and institutional framework to poverty 
reduction, sustainable growth and effective use of development assistance. 
 
Figure 2.25. Fragility indicators in ESAR countries, 2018 
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Source: OECD (2018). States of Fragility 2018. 
Notes: Data unavailable for Botswana, Namibia and South Africa; a value of 5 represents maximum fragility. 
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associated with violence, breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or 
other emergencies, in addition to its capacity to mitigate, absorb and manage the various 
risks. Applying this framework to ESAR reveals that most countries are heavily exposed to 
all five risk dimensions, including political, societal, economic, environmental and security 
(Figure 2.25). While Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan are among the 
most fragile countries in the world, the OECD views the risks in Botswana, Namibia and 
South Africa as being so low that their status is not even monitored. 
 
2.6 Takeaways 
 
Key trends 
 
o Dramatic population growth presents daunting challenges (such as maintaining 
current coverage rates of social services) as well as transformational opportunities 
(including the potential for fast and prolonged economic growth due to declining 
dependency rates). To highlight the potential benefits, the IMF estimates that a one 
percentage point decline in the dependency ratio translates to a 0.5 per cent increase in 
real per capita GDP growth.17 
 
o More than 40 per cent of the population is affected by extreme poverty according to the 
US$1.90/day international line (in PPP, 2011 international US$), which jumps to more than 
80 per cent if using the US$5.50/day line. 
 
o Although there has been important progress toward improving the lives of children, many 
basic indicators have not performed well in absolute terms, largely due to population growth. 
o Approximately two in every three children – or around 160 million of the 260 million 
under-18 population in the region – suffer from multi-dimensional poverty. 
o Most countries are facing high levels of political, societal, economic, 
environmental and security fragility. 
 
Implications for children 
 
o High poverty rates across ESAR mean that most families cannot adequately 
provide for their children. And even where families live above the poverty line, 
children’s basic needs often go unmet, underscoring the critical role of social 
services for ensuring child well-being. 
o However, a snapshot of the latest social development indicators confirms that 
essential social services are performing poorly for children in the region. 
o Children in ESAR will remain under threat as long as governments are unable to 
address  basic social service delivery bottlenecks, including human resources (e.g. 
the severe shortages of qualified personnel) and supplies (e.g. the unavailability or 
stockout of vaccines, nutritional supplements, learning materials and medicines, 
especially anti- diarrheal, anti-malarial, antiretroviral therapy and deworming). 
o Despite the undisputed and extensive positive benefits on health, education and 
nutrition outcomes, as well as poverty reduction,18 children in the region continue to 
be failed by the limited scope and piecemeal approach of social protection systems, 
which have not been prioritized by most governments. 
 
17 IMF (2014). Africa Rising: Harnessing the Demographic Dividend. Washington, DC. 
18 Davis, B. et al. (2016). From Evidence to Action: The Story of Cash Transfers and Impact Evaluation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. London: FAO, UNICEF and Oxford University Press. 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3. 
THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND CHILDREN 
 
 
This chapter describes the current and forecast economic context of ESAR to better 
understand how growth trends affect children and services available to them . After 
discussing the size and structure of the various economies in the region, it presents the near-
term economic growth outlook, looking at both overall rates and how they change once 
factoring in price and demographic changes. The chapter next reviews income inequality 
trends, focusing on Gini coefficients, income distribution and the impact of policies to improve 
existing disparities. It concludes by summarizing the main economic trends in the region, 
along with the implications for children. 
 
3.1 The size of the economy 
 
ESAR contains economies of a wide variety of sizes but is dominated by South Africa . 
In 2019, the region’s total GDP is projected to be around US$2.1 trillion (in PPP, current 
international US$) if accounting for price differences across countries or US$894 billion   if 
measuring prices based on expected foreign exchange rates. South Africa accounts   for 
nearly 40 per cent of total regional output and is roughly the same size as 18 of the other 20 
economies combined (i.e. all of them except Angola and Ethiopia) (Figure 3.01). After South 
Africa comes a group of medium-sized economies – Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya and the United 
Republic of Tanzania – which each contribute approximately 10 per cent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.01. Country contributions to GDP in ESAR, 2019 projections (as % of regional GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
Notes: Each of the countries included in the group “9 countries” has a projected GDP of US$30 billion or less in 2019 (in PPP,  current 
international US$), which ranges from US$1.5 billion in Comoros to US$30 billion in Rwanda; data unavailable for Somalia. 
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Figure 3.02 Sector contribution to GDP in ESAR countries, 2017 (as % of GDP) 
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Notes: Does not include data for Comoros, Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan. 
* Manufacturing is a sub-group of industry but separated here for analytical purposes. 
 
 
of total regional output. The other 15 economies account for the remaining 20 per cent of 
regional GDP, ranging from the small island nation of Comoros to Uganda (US$1.5 billion 
and US$105 billion, respectively, in PPP, current international US$). 
 
3.2 The structure of the economy 
 
The service sector is the largest contributor to GDP in ESAR. In 2017, services – e.g. hotels 
and restaurants, transportation, government, financial, and professional and personal 
services (education, health care, real estate and so on) – accounted for more than half of 
regional output (Figure 3.02). With its developed banking and retail sectors, South Africa 
boasts the largest service sector, at nearly 70 per cent, with other economies in southern 
Africa close behind, including Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe. In contrast, services 
contributed less than half of GDP in Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and the United 
Republic of Tanzania. 
 
Industry is the second most important component of economic activity in the region. 
In 2017 around 27 per cent of GDP, on average, consisted of activities related to 
construction, electricity, gas, manufacturing, mining and water. Ethiopia experienced 
an impressive expansion of its industrial sector, which grew from less than 10 per cent 
of GDP in 2012 to more than 23 per cent in 2017. At 20 per cent or less of GDP, industrial 
activities are relatively insignificant in seven countries (Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, 
Malawi and Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe). When separating manufacturing from 
industry for analytical purposes, just over 10 per cent of economies in ESAR are 
engaged in transforming materials or substances into new products, like apparel, 
chemicals, electronics, food and drinks, furniture, metals, petroleum, plastic, textiles 
and so on. This is far below the average levels observed in the group of developing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 countries in East Asia that have relied on manufacturing to catapult and sustain 
economic growth in recent years (24 per cent, on average).19 
 
Accounting for around a fifth of output, agriculture is the smallest sector in ESAR, 
although it remains critical to some economies.20 In terms of total output, agriculture 
remains very insignificant in most southern Africa countries. For instance, in Eswatini, 
Lesotho, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the average contribution of agriculture to the 
economy was 7-9 per cent in 2017 but barely over 2 per cent in Botswana and South Africa. 
In stark contrast, the agricultural sector makes up a third or more of economic output in 
Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania. 
 
3.3 Economic growth trends 
 
Economic growth for the region remains positive in nominal terms but is much less 
impressive after adjusting for rising prices. When looking at nominal growth, the region 
is expected to grow by an average of 11.9 per cent over the 2019-20 period, which is close 
to 7 per cent slower than during the 2017-18 period (18.5 per cent).21 However, once 
adjusting for changing prices, ESAR economies are projected to grow by 3.6 per cent   in 
real terms, on average, a slight uptick over the 2017-18 average pace of 3.1 per cent (Figure 
3.03). There is, however, a significant difference when distinguishing between resource- and 
non-resource-intensive economies (see Box 3.1), with the former projected to grow 1.6 
percentage points more slowly in real terms over 2019-20 (2.7 per cent versus 4.2 per cent). 
The fall in global commodity prices in recent years, including for energy, agriculture and 
metals (see Section 5.5), have acted a drag on those economies that heavily depend on 
natural resources as a main driver of growth.22 
 
At the country level, economic growth outlooks cover all extremes. On the downside, 
Zimbabwe is predicted to be in recession due to the ongoing political and economic crisis 
(the projected real decline is 5.9 per cent in 2019, although this is expected to turn positive 
in 2020); recession is similarly forecast in Eswatini. Angola, Burundi, Lesotho, Namibia, 
South Africa are also projected to grow sluggishly – at less than 1.7 per cent in real terms 
in 2019-20. In contrast, with real GDP growth projected between 7 and 8 per cent in 
2019-20, Ethiopia, Rwanda and South Sudan are amongst the fastest expanding 
 
19 This reflects the average valued added of manufacturing as percentage of GDP in 2017 among China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand, based on the World Bank Consolidated National Accounts. 
20 Agriculture is the  smallest  sector  in  economic  terms,  but  the  largest  in  terms  of  employment,  as covered 
in Chapter 4. 
21 Author’s calculations based on the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
22 IMF (2019). Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Economic Outlook: Recovery and Elevated Uncertainty. Washington, DC. 
 
 
Box 3.1. Resource-intensive and non-resource-intensive economies 
 
 
Resource-intensive economies are defined as those with either net oil exports accounting for at least 30 
per cent of exports (Angola and South Sudan) or non-renewable natural resources accounting for at least 
25 per cent of total exports (Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe). While resource-intensive countries have the potential to use the additional income from 
the resources to promote development, these countries are also vulnerable to volatile global resource 
prices, which can expose them to macroeconomic shocks. 
 
Source: IMF (2017). Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa – Fiscal Adjustment and Economic Diversification. 
Washington, DC, p.77. 
  
 
Figure 3.03. Real GDP growth in ESAR countries, 2017-18 and 2019-20 period averages (as %) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
 
 
economies in the world. South Sudan, in particular, is projected to make one of the 
biggest economic turnarounds, with growth jumping from -3.3 per cent in 2017-18 to 7 
per cent in 2019-20. Kenya, Madagascar and Uganda are also expected to experience 
robust growth over the near term (between 5 and 6 per cent). 
 
Unfortunately, economic growth is not keeping pace with population growth across the 
region. Once accounting for the ongoing demographic changes (discussed in Chapter   2), 
the regional growth outlook falls from 3.6 to 1.3 per cent over the 2019-20 period, on average. 
Eight countries are expected to experience negative or no growth in real per capita terms 
during 2019-20, including Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Eswatini, Namibia, South Africa, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe (Figure 3.04). The outlooks for Ethiopia and Rwanda (close to 6 per 
cent real per capita annual growth in 2019-20) and South Sudan (4 per cent) remain strong, 
although population growth is predicted to clip around 2.5 percentage points when 
compared to the real estimate. The difference between resource- and non- resource-
intensive economies also remains strong (0.3 versus 1.9 per cent, respectively, on average). 
 
Current economic forecasts also suggest that income growth will not make a major dent 
on poverty for most countries in the near future. The rule of 72 is a formula commonly used 
in finance and economics to approximate how long it will take for the value of something 
to double based on a fixed growth rate (e.g. an investment or income). Applying this to 
the real GDP per capita growth rate projections for the 2019-20 period paints a dire 
picture. If the regional growth rate of 1.3 per cent were maintained indefinitely, it would 
take around 55 years for incomes to double, on average. 
 
However, potential progress on poverty alleviation becomes much more alarming at the 
country level. To start with, seven ESAR countries are projected to have negative 
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Figure 3.04. Real GDP per capita growth in ESAR countries, 
2017-18 and 2019-20 period averages (as %) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
 
 
Figure 3.05. Number of years required to double per capita incomes in 13 ESAR countries 
(based on projected real GDP per capita growth rate over the 2019-20 period) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
Note: Data for Angola, Burundi, Eswatini, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe are not presented because real GDP      
per capita growth is projected to be negative during 2019-20. 
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 GDP growth rates over the 2019-20 period in real per capita terms, which means that 
the rule of 72 cannot be used. This implies that income levels will decline over the 
near term with poverty likely rising – and potentially significantly in places like Burundi 
and Zimbabwe. In Comoros, if the 0.14 per cent real GDP per capita growth forecast 
was maintained indefinitely, it would take roughly 500 years for incomes to double 
across the island nation (Figure 3.05). The prospects are slightly more optimistic in 
Lesotho and Mozambique: their expected real per capita growth rates of 1.4 and 1.3 
per cent respectively suggest that incomes would double in just over 50 years – in 
line with the regional average rate. There are, however, several outliers. If the nearly 
6 per cent real per capita growth rates in Ethiopia and Rwanda were sustained, 
average incomes in the countries would double in about a dozen years – somewhere 
around 2030. 
 
3.4 Income inequality 
 
ESAR houses many of the most inequitable societies on the planet. While rising GDP 
per capita is often viewed as a measure of increasing opportunities and improved lives, 
the level of income inequality influences the impact that growth has on poverty reduction. 
Based on Gini coefficients, which assess the distribution of income among individuals or 
households within a country,23 Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia boast the 
highest income inequality rates in the world (Figure 3.06). Of the 158 countries with 
recorded Gini coefficients since the year 2000, seven of the highest Gini coefficients are 
from ESAR – in addition to the four countries mentioned above, 
 
23 A Gini coefficient value of 1 (or .01) means that everybody in the population has the exact same income (perfect 
equality), while a value of 100 (or 1.0) means that one person earns all income (perfect inequality). 
 
Figure 3.06. Gini coefficients in ESAR countries, 2015 or latest available 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, Development Research Group, PovcalNet. 
Note: Data unavailable for Eritrea and Somalia. 
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 this includes Eswatini, Lesotho and Mozambique. Several countries do perform relatively 
better, including Burundi, Ethiopia and the United Republic of Tanzania, all of which 
recently had Gini coefficients under 40. 
 
One of the more pressing concerns is that higher levels of income are associated with 
higher levels of income inequality. While LICs in ESAR recently had an average Gini 
coefficient value of 44, this rises to 49 for LMICs, on average, and surges to 61 for the three 
UMICs, on average (see also Figure 3.06). This indicates that despite achieving LMIC or 
UMIC status, huge numbers of people continue to live in monetary poverty. 
 
The distribution of income within ESAR countries further reveals the intensity of 
inequality. South Africa is the most egregious example. There, the top ten per cent of the 
population earns 56 times more income than the bottom ten per cent, which amounts    to 
more than half of the entire income of the country (Figure 3.07). Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia 
and Zambia are not far beyond, with the wealthiest decile earning around 44 times more 
than the poorest decile. For the region as a whole, the average ratio is around 25. Yet the 
differences across income levels remain poignant, with the ratio of income controlled by the 
richest and poorest deciles going from 15 in LICs and 24 in LMICs, on average, and 
skyrocketing to 49 among the three UMICs, on average. 
 
The prevailing income disparities across the region are the result of multiple, 
interconnected factors. One of the principal drivers is a two-tier division of income: a group 
of highly paid government and multinational employees versus poorly paid workers in the 
informal sector.24 But there are other factors as well. For instance, rural-urban 
 
24 Odusola, A. et al. (2017). Income Inequality Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa: Divergence, Determinants, and Consequences. 
New York City: UNDP. 
 
Figure 3.07. Income distribution in ESAR countries, 2016 or latest available (income earned by 
the wealthiest and poorest population deciles as % of total income – and the ratio) 
 
60.0 
50.0 
 
40.0 
30.0 
 
20.0 
10.0 
 
0.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income share held by highest 10% Income share held by lowest 10% Ratio 
 
 
Source: World Bank, Development Research Group, PovcalNet. 
Note: Data unavailable for Eritrea and Somalia. 
    
T
an
za
n
ia
 
B
u
ru
n
d
i 
Et
h
io
p
ia
 
Z
im
b
a
b
w
e
 
U
g
a
n
d
a
 
M
a
d
a
g
a
sc
a
r 
R
w
a
n
d
a
 
M
a
la
w
i 
C
o
m
o
ro
s 
So
u
th
 
Su
d
a
n
 
M
o
za
m
b
iq
u
e
 
A
ve
ra
g
e
 
K
e
n
ya
 
A
n
g
o
la
 
E
sw
a
ti
n
i 
Z
am
b
ia
 
L
e
so
th
o
 
A
ve
ra
g
e
 
B
o
ts
w
a
n
a
 
N
am
ib
ia
 
So
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
 
A
ve
ra
g
e
 
 inequalities are so profound in some ESAR countries that economic growth has 
increased inequality and done little to alleviate rural poverty. A World Bank study of the 
United Republic of Tanzania25 found that, despite being one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world between 2001 and 2007, incidence of poverty remained constant 
at 33 per cent before declining only moderately to 28 per cent in 2012. Another key driver 
is the lack of access to basic services. Quality education is among the services known to 
break intergenerational inequality and allow individuals to contribute to and benefit from 
economic growth.26 However, as described in Chapter 2, this remains an overwhelming 
challenge for most ESAR countries. 
 
Available evidence suggests that government policies can help reduce income inequality 
in the region. One approach to measuring the redistributive impact of policies is to 
compare Gini coefficients before and after taxes and transfers – in other words, to assess 
the distribution of net income across the population once accounting for “lost” income 
(tax payments to the government) and “unearned” income (cash and other in-kind 
benefits received from the government) by different individuals. A review of the latest 
estimates in ESAR countries indicates that redistributive policies led Gini coefficients to 
fall by 5.1, on average, amounting to a nearly 10 percentage point improvement (Figure 
3.08). The impacts were most impressive in UMICs, where Gini coefficients dropped by 8 
(or a 12 per cent improvement), on average, nearly twice the pace observed in LICs and 
LMICs. 
 
 
25 Hassine, N., and Zeufack, A. (2015). Inequality of Outcomes and Inequality of Opportunity in Tanzania. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
26 Odusola, A. et al. (2017). 
 
 
Figure 3.08. Gini coefficients before and after taxes and transfers in ESAR countries, 2016 
or latest available 
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Source: Solt, F. (2016). The Standardized World Income Inequality Database, Social Science Quarterly 97(5):1267-1281. Version 7.1, August 
2018. 
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 Nonetheless, the impacts of redistributive policies vary widely across countries. South 
Africa emerges as the country with the biggest progress, as its Gini coefficient falls from 
69 to 59 once factoring in the effects of taxes and transfers on income. In contrast, 
government policies in Eswatini and the United Republic of Tanzania have exacerbated 
income inequality. This likely reflects a broader challenge facing most governments in 
the region, namely implementing progressive tax regimes. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
the limited amount of revenue that most governments extract from their economies 
impedes their redistributive capacity. At the same time, in economies characterized by 
high rates of informal employment and low exports, government revenue remains 
heavily dependent on value added and sales taxes, which are paid equally by all persons 
but consume a much larger share of income among poorer households, thus negatively 
affecting levels of inequality.27 
 
 
3.5 Takeaways 
 
Key trends 
 
o South Africa is the dominant economy in ESAR, but other economies with some 
of the fastest growth rates in the world, especially in eastern Africa, will become 
increasingly influential. 
o The services sector is already the largest contributor to GDP in the region and will 
drive future growth in most economies. 
o Once factoring in price and demographic changes, the economic growth outlooks 
look much less impressive and are nowhere near fast enough to significantly boost 
incomes and poverty alleviation over medium-term horizons. 
o Income inequality across the region is appalling, although government policies are 
helping to at least partially improve the distribution of income in some countries. 
 
Implications for children 
 
o Economic growth directly affects child well-being by inter alia: (i) preventing deaths 
(a cross-country study of 59 developing countries found that a one per cent fall in 
GDP is associated with an increase in infant mortality rates of between 0.31 and 
0.79 per cent28); (ii) improving education outcomes (this includes higher primary  and 
secondary school enrolment rates,29 lower repetition and dropout rates as well as better 
test scores30); (iii) enhancing health (among the many documented benefits include 
longer lives31 and lower levels of HIV32); and (iv) reducing poverty (cross-country 
estimates show that a 10 per cent increase in national income reduces poverty between 
20 and 30 per cent33). 
o Income inequality undermines the potential for economic growth to improve 
children’s lives; one study suggests that a 1 per cent increase in per capita income 
lowers poverty by 4.3 per cent in countries with very low levels of inequality or as 
little as 0.6 per cent in high inequality settings.34 
o Based on experiences in other regions, the ongoing economic structural change 
from agriculture to service activities could have a positive effect on employment 
opportunities, child labour and poverty reduction.35 
 
27 Gaspar, V. and Abebe, A. (2017). Taxes, Debt and Development: A One-Percent Rule to Raise Revenues in Africa. 
28 Baird, S., Friedman, J., and Schady, N. (2007). Aggregate Income Shocks and Infant Mortality in the Developing World. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4346. 
29 Department for International Development (2005). From Commitment to Action: Human Development and Growth. 
30 Lee, J. and Barro, R. (2001). Schooling Quality in a Cross-Section of Countries. Economica, vol. 68, no. 271, 465-488. 
31 Barro, R., and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1995). Economic Growth. New York City: McGraw-Hill. 
32 UNDP (2004). Human Development Report 2004. New York City. 
33 Adams, R. (2002). Economic Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Findings from a New Data Set. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 2972; Ravallion, M. and Chen, S. (1997). What Can New Survey Data Tell Us about Recent Changes 
in Distribution and Poverty? World Bank Economic Review, vol. 11, no. 2. 
34 Ravallion, M. (2007). Inequality is Bad for the Poor, Chapter 2. In Inequality and Poverty Re-examined, Jenkins, S., and 
Micklewright, J. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
35 Alam, A. et al. (2008). Unleashing Prosperity: Productivity Growth in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. 
Washington, DC: World Bank; and Rodrik, D. (2017) Growth Without Industrialization? Project Syndicate, 10 October. 
 CHAPTER 4. 
THE EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 
AND CHILDREN 
 
This chapter examines the health of labour markets in the region and how recent trends are 
likely to be affecting workers, their families and children. It starts by providing an overview 
of the main sectors that create job opportunities for parents and young workers, as well 
as the recent evolution of unemployment rates. To address some of the shortcomings of 
traditional indicators and offer a more holistic picture of the current jobs situation, it then 
reviews labour force participation rates across the region. Given the persistent challenges 
of creating well-paid jobs in the formal sector, the chapter next discusses recent working 
poverty trends. It then turns to young workers, looking at the availability of decent job 
opportunities along with the demographic forces that will continue to shape their labour 
market prospects – and the prospects of overall economic prosperity – in both the near and 
distant future. The chapter concludes by summarizing key employment trends along with 
their implications for working families, young workers and children. 
 
4.1 Employment opportunities 
 
The agricultural sector is the most important employer in ESAR, and especially in LICs. 
Based on 2019 projections, agriculture accounts for nearly 60 per cent of all jobs in the 
region on average, with at least half of the working population in 16 of the 21 countries 
earning livelihoods from crop cultivation, livestock production, fishing, forestry and 
hunting activities (Figure 4.01). Agriculture provides more than 70 per cent of employment 
opportunities in Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia and Uganda, and more than 90 per cent 
in Burundi. In some contexts, however, especially UMICs, agriculture plays a much less 
prominent role, less than one-quarter of jobs in Botswana and Namibia, 13 per cent in 
Eswatini and just 5 per cent in South Africa. 
 
As described in Chapter 3, the services sector accounts for more than half of regional 
output, on average, but just one in three jobs. Nonetheless, service-related activities, 
especially entertainment, tourism, transport and government, are an important source of 
employment in most countries. In the group of southern Africa countries, the services sector 
is main employer. It accounts for more than 70 per cent of jobs in South Africa and 60 per 
cent or more in Botswana, Eswatini and Namibia. Compared to the agricultural and services 
sectors, industry, including manufacturing, is the least significant employer, providing only 
around one in ten jobs in the region. 
 
Given the high dependence on the agriculture sector, most jobs in the region are in the 
informal sector. Workers in the informal economy could be persons that produce goods 
that are exclusively consumed by households (e.g. subsistence farming), contributing family 
members (including formal sector businesses if the family member does not have a contract), 
paid domestic staff, or employees of formal or informal sector enterprises that are not subject 
to labour laws, income taxation, or social protection and other benefits. The 14 ESAR 
countries that have recent data show that around three out of every for workers are employed 
outside the formal sector, on average (Figure 4.02). In Burundi, Madagascar, Malawi and 
Mozambique, the latest estimates show that 90 per cent or more of jobs are located in the 
informal sector. And even in South Africa, which has both the largest economy and the most 
advanced services sector, nearly 50 per cent of jobs are informal. 
  
 
Figure 4.01. Employment by sector in ESAR countries, 2019 (as % of total employment) 
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Source: ILOSTAT (modelled estimates as of November 2018). 
 
 
Figure 4.02. Employment inside and outside the formal sector in ESAR 
countries, 2018 or latest available (as % of total employment) 
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Note: Limited data availability. 
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 4.2 Unemployment 
 
The unemployment rate is the most well-known labour market indicator. It tries to measure 
the ability of the economy to create jobs and specifically looks at those persons who are 
available and actively seeking to work during a specific period (e.g. a day, week, month) but 
remain without a job. Employment could be paid through a wage or salary, or it could be 
self-employment. Importantly for ESAR, unemployment rates capture job seekers in both 
the formal and informal sectors of the economy. This highlights one of the main limitations 
of the unemployment rate as a general labour market indicator: it says nothing about the 
quality of available jobs. It also excludes abled-bodied persons who want to work but have 
stopped looking due to limited opportunities (i.e. search fatigue or hopelessness), low labour 
mobility, discrimination or other structural or social barriers.36 It is therefore important to 
bear these limitations in mind when interpreting data and also to consider alternative 
indicators, like labour force participation rates, which are discussed shortly. 
 
As a region, ESAR has one of the highest unemployment rates in the world. According to 
the ILO, the unemployment rate is forecast to be 9.5 per cent in 2019, which is substantially 
higher than both the global average (5 per cent) and the average for Sub-Saharan Africa 
(5.9 per cent) (Figure 4.03). Of the regions presented, only North Africa and South America 
have higher unemployment rates. While regions like North America, Europe and Central Asia 
and even North Africa have experienced declining unemployment rates in recent years, the 
rate has been constant in ESAR since 2014. 
 
High unemployment is particularly pervasive in countries in southern Africa. For the region, 
seven countries are projected to have unemployment rates in double figures in 2019 (Figure 
4.04). Even more alarming is that five MICs, all located in southern Africa, are expected to have 
unemployment rates close to or higher than 20 per cent. These include Botswana, Eswatini, 
Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa, the latter which is not far from 30 per cent. Several 
fragile states are additionally facing severe job-creation challenges, with unemployment 
rates in Somalia and South Sudan hovering around 13.5 per cent, on average. 
 
Some countries have very low unemployment rates but face other labour market 
challenges. For example, unemployment rates in Burundi, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Rwanda, 
Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania are projected to be less than 2 per cent in 
2019. However, rather than signalling a well-functioning labour market, these trends 
mainly reflect the reality that, in the absence of savings and social safety nets, people 
need to work to survive irrespective of working conditions or remuneration.37 As a result, 
the very low unemployment rates observed in some of the poorest countries in ESAR 
indicate that workers have no alternative but to engage in informal, short-term or part-time 
employment rather than being unemployed while searching for better options.38 
 
4.3 Labour force participation 
 
As mentioned above, unemployment rates exclude persons who are not actively seeking 
employment, which mask important job market challenges. Given the limitations of this 
indicator, a more comprehensive employment picture can be obtained by looking at the 
labour force participation rate. This measures the proportion of the working-age population 
that is either currently employed or searching for work. 
 
When looking at labour force participation rates, nearly three in four working age persons 
 
36 International Labour Organization (ILO) (2016). Unemployment Rate. 
37 ILO (2017). Unemployment Protection: A Good Practices Guide and Training Package. Geneva. 
38 Stuart, E., Samman, E. and Hunt, A. (2018). Informal is the New Normal: Improving the Lives of Workers at Risk of 
Being Left Behind. ODI working paper No. 530. 
  
 
Figure 4.03. Average unemployment rates in select regions, 2010-20 (as % of the labour force) 
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Figure 4.04. Unemployment rates in ESAR countries, 2019 (as % of labour force) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ILOSTAT (modelled estimates as of November 2018). 
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Figure 4.05. Labour force participation rates and gender 
differences in ESAR countries, 2019 (as % of total) 
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in ESAR are active in the labour market. Based on the latest projections, roughly 73 per 
cent of 15-64 year olds are expected to have jobs or be looking for work in 2019, on average 
(Figure 4.05). Labour force participation rates are much lower in southern African countries 
and in fragile contexts, for example around 55 per cent in Eswatini and South Africa and 
45 per cent in Comoros and Somalia. In contrast, most LICs in the region have strong 
participation rates at 80 per cent or more, including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Rwanda, 
the United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Gender differences are also notable, which 
indicate that women face greater barriers to accessing jobs. For the region, labour force 
participation rates are projected to be around 8 per cent higher for males than for females, 
on average, with the difference close to or above 10 per cent in more than half of the 
region; the gap reaches as high as 25 per cent in Eswatini and 55 per cent in Somalia. 
 
4.4 Working poverty 
 
The overall low quality and poor pay of available jobs entrenches large numbers of workers 
– and their families – in poverty. According to the ILO’s projections for 2019, the average 
working poverty rate in ESAR countries is 36 per cent (Figure 4.06). This means that the 
income earned by more than one out of every three jobs, on average, is insufficient to 
breach the global extreme poverty line. When looking across countries, the working 
poverty rates in most MICs in southern Africa are at or below 10 per cent. However, they 
exceed 50 per cent in Mozambique and Zambia, are around 65 per cent in Malawi and 
Somalia, and extend beyond 70 per cent in Burundi and Madagascar. 
 
It is important to contextualize the magnitude of working poverty in the region alongside 
the very weak social assistance systems in most countries. As discussed earlier in Section 
2.3.5, less than a quarter of workers and their families are supported by programmes 
  
 
Figure 4.06. Working poverty rates in ESAR countries, 2019 
(as % of employed living below PPP, current international US$1.90/day) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ILOSTAT (ILO estimates and projections). 
Note: Data unavailable for South Sudan. 
 
to help them transition through difficult circumstances, including job loss, prolonged 
unemployment, injury and sickness. In other words, the absence of comprehensive social 
assistance exacerbates poverty among working and non-working populations. 
 
4.5 Youth in the labour market 
 
Young workers face even more daunting challenges than adults in the region. The 
unemployment rate for new labour market entrants (aged 15-24) that are actively searching 
but unable to find work is projected to be nearly 18 per cent in 2019, on average, affecting 
some 5.8 million young workers (Figure 4.07). This means that unemployment rates for 
youth are almost double those of adults. ESAR also performs considerably worse than 
the projected youth unemployment rates in 2019 for the world (11.9 per cent) and for Sub- 
Saharan Africa (9.8 per cent). Youth unemployment improved between 2010, when the rate 
was greater than 19 per cent, and 2017, when it was close to 17 per cent. However, the 
positive movement has since reversed and is expected to continue to steadily rise at least 
until 2020, with both the overall rate and the numbers of affected youth on the uptick. 
 
Working poverty is also more prevalent among young workers and reaches distressing 
levels in many places. The average working poverty rate among youth in the region is 
projected to be 40 per cent in 2019, five percentage points higher than the rate for adults 
(35 per cent) (Figure 4.08). However, this gap is much higher in countries such as Angola, 
Kenya and Lesotho, where it nears 10 per cent. This implies that, compared to adult 
workers, a larger share of young workers earns low wages and are thus facing greater 
difficulties to escape poverty. In nine countries, more than one in two young workers has 
a job that earns an amount less than the global poverty line of US$1.90/day (in PPP, 2011 
international US$). In Burundi, Madagascar, Malawi and Somalia, at least two out of 
 
  
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4.07. Youth unemployment trends in ESAR, 2010-20 (in 
number of and as % of the 15-24 labour force) 
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Source: ILOSTAT (modelled estimates as of November 2018). 
 
 
Figure 4.08. Youth and adult working poverty rates in ESAR countries, 
2019 (as % of employed 15-24 and 25-64 year olds living below the 
global poverty line, and total number of 15-24 year olds) 
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Source: ILOSTAT (ILO estimates and projections). 
Note: Data unavailable for South Sudan. 
 every three young workers have jobs that do not enable them to escape poverty. As with 
adults, working poverty among youth is relatively lower in countries in southern Africa. In 
aggregate numbers, poverty is expected to impact the lives of 24.3 million young workers 
across the region, with the largest numbers in Mozambique (2.2 million), Madagascar (3.2 
million), the United Republic of Tanzania (3.7 million) and Ethiopia (4.1 million). 
 
4.6 New workers and the youth bulge 
 
The number of new entrants into the labour force is increasing dramatically in the coming 
decades. Using the international definition of working age,39 11.7 million persons in ESAR 
are expected to turn 15 years old during 2019 (Figure 4.09). Projections indicate that this 
will grow to around 15 million per year in 2030, 20 million in 2050 and surpass 25 million 
at some point in the 2080s. The size of the youth labour force (15-24 year olds) is growing 
equally fast. It currently stands around 109 million and will mushroom to around 200 
million in 2050, equating to a 75 per cent expansion in just three decades. 
 
Of greater concern is that the region has already reached its youth bulge peak. The youth 
bulge is a demographic phenomenon whereby the proportion of young persons (15-24) in 
the working age population (15-64) steadily rises. As the ratio grows larger, the potential 
output of an economy also rises as more and more young people reach working age. 
Reaching close to 40 per cent in 2003, the regional ratio has steadily fallen since (see also 
Figure 4.09). It currently stands around 36 per cent and is projected to reach 29 per cent in 
 
39 For statistical purposes and to enable international comparability, the working-age population is defined as persons 
aged 15 and older. 
 
 
Figure 4.09. New workers and the labour force size in ESAR, 1950-2100 
(in millions of 15 and 16-24 year olds and 15-24 as % of working age population) 
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Table 4.01. Youth bulge peaks in ESAR countries, estimated year 
 
Country Year 15-24 as % of working age population 
Zambia 2000 21.0 
Botswana 2002 23.1 
South Africa 2003 20.8 
Kenya 2004 22.0 
Eritrea 2005 23.7 
Rwanda 2005 23.4 
Zimbabwe 2005 23.8 
Comoros 2006 20.9 
Lesotho 2006 22.6 
Burundi 2007 22.0 
Eswatini 2010 24.3 
Namibia 2012 21.8 
South Sudan 2016 20.4 
Ethiopia 2018 21.8 
Madagascar 2018 20.6 
Malawi 2025 21.0 
Mozambique 2025 20.6 
Uganda 2025 20.9 
Angola 2029 20.5 
Tanzania 2030 20.3 
Somalia 2040 20.3 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UN DESA World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision (medium variant estimates). 
 
2050. This means that, although the number of new young workers continues to increase, 
their relative contribution to total economic output is diminishing. 
 
At the country level, current youth bulge positions suggest that the demographic 
dividend window has already closed in some places and is quickly closing elsewhere. As 
of 2019, 15 of 21 ESAR countries had already experienced their youth bulge peaks (Table 
4.01). Botswana, South Africa and Zambia were the first countries to cross the threshold in 
the early 2000s, with Ethiopia and Madagascar most recently doing so in 2018. Three 
countries are projected to have an increasing share of young workers until 2025 (Malawi, 
Mozambique and Uganda), while Angola and the United Republic of Tanzania should peak 
somewhere around 2030 and Somalia in 2040. 
 
4.7 Takeaways 
 
Key trends 
 
o The agricultural sector remains the main source of employment opportunities, 
accounting for more than half of available jobs in 16 of the 21 countries. 
o At nearly 10 per cent, the region boasts one of the highest unemployment rates in the 
world, with most countries in southern Africa currently dealing with rates beyond 20 per 
cent, with associated prospects of increasing social unrest. 
o It is projected that close to six million young workers will not be able to find jobs in 2019 
indicating that the region is in the midst of a youth jobs crisis. The continuous flow of 
new entrants into the labour market further suggests that the youth jobs crisis could be at 
a tipping point. 
 o Moreover, unemployment rates for youth are almost twice as high as those for adults 
and projected to progressively worsen over the near term. 
o Even where jobs are available, wages are not helping young or adult workers to move 
out of poverty, which affects more than one out of every three workers in the region and 
50 per cent or more of workers in six countries (Burundi, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Somalia and Zambia). 
o The demographic dividend window is closing in most countries, raising the urgency for 
governments to invest in programmes that can catalyse the benefits. 
 
Implications for children 
 
o There is no greater predictor of children’s health, education and well-being than reliable 
household income,40 but the overall poor quality and low pay of available jobs in most 
ESAR economies do not provide the opportunity for millions of workers – and their 
children – to escape poverty. 
 
o Ensuring that the economy provides quality jobs that include protections is 
critical for children’s education: 
 
▪ Returns to education (wages) have been shown in numerous studies to be 
closely tied to enrolment rates and the average number of years of schooling.41 
▪ Where parents and children see no benefit from education, students are more 
likely to drop out;42 this is a major risk in those countries with high unemployment 
and/or working poverty rates. 
o If children grow up suffering from health, nutrition or psycho-social problems or 
inadequate education, they will not help catalyse the positive benefits of the 
demographic dividend when they reach working age.43 
o As young workers continue to accumulate “wage scars,” 44 which describe the likelihood 
of being jobless and/or earning lower wages later in life due to prolonged bouts of 
unemployment, the jobs crisis is putting a generation of new labour market entrants at 
severe risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 Morrissey, T., Hutchison, L. and Winsler, A. (2014). Family Income, School Attendance and Academic Achievement in 
Elementary School. Developmental Psychology, vol. 50, no. 3, 741-753. 
41 Nguyen, T. (2008). Information, Role Models, and Perceived Returns to Education: Experimental Evidence from 
Madagascar. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
42 ILO (2012). Africa’s Response to the Youth Employment Crisis. Geneva. 
43 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (2016). Foundations for the Future: Building Quality Human Capital for Economic 
Transformation and Sustainable Development in the Context of the Istanbul Programme of Action. New York City. 
44 Ortiz, I. and Cummins, M. (2012). When the Global Crisis and Youth Bulge Collide: Double the Jobs Trouble for Youth. 
UNICEF Social and Economic Policy Working Paper. 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. 
THE INFLATION OUTLOOK AND CHILDREN 
 
 
This chapter reviews recent and projected inflation rates in ESAR and how these affect 
children. Inflation can be defined as a sustained rise in the general level of prices or, in 
other words, when the prices of multiple goods and services in an economy, like beverages, 
clothes, entertainment, fuel, food, housing and transportation, rise simultaneously. The 
initial aim of the chapter is to discuss the different ways that inflation can take hold of an 
economy along with the impacts, including the good, the bad, and the winners and 
losers. Following the introduction, the chapter analyses recent inflation trends in ESAR, 
first looking at overall price levels and then zooming in on food prices, which have a direct 
impact on the nutritional intake of children. The chapter next turns to global commodity 
prices to see how recent forecasts bode for price stability in the region. It then assesses how 
inflation has affected social transfer programmes over time, and how this could also have 
dire consequences for children and their families. The chapter concludes by summarizing 
the key trends along with the implications for children. 
 
5.1 Causes of inflation45 
 
Economists identify two general causes of inflation: demand-pull and cost-push. These 
categorize the source of increasing pressures on price levels, which can stem from both 
demand-side and supply-side factors. The two types can – and often do – occur 
simultaneously, which create even more dramatic effects on prices. These concepts, along 
with illustrative examples, are introduced below. 
 
Demand-pull inflation occurs when too much money chases too few goods and/or the 
economy operates at full employment or grows faster than its long-term rate. Some 
common examples are presented below. 
• Expansionary fiscal policy: This is when governments lower taxes and/or increase 
spending, typically to stimulate economic growth. By lowering taxes, the amount of 
discretionary income available to business and consumers increases. While businesses 
may spend this on things like capital investment, new employees or salary increases, 
consumers may purchase more non-essential items than normal. Both forces can drive 
prices up. Similarly, by increasing government spending, overall demand for goods 
and services in the economy increases, which can also cause prices to tick upwards. 
• Expansionary monetary policy: This is when a central bank lowers the benchmark 
interest rate by increasing the supply of money circulating in the economy. The net effect 
is that the value of money is reduced vis-à-vis the price of goods. If the supply of goods 
does not adjust upwards to meet the new demand for spending, then there will be upward 
pressure on prices. 
 
• Fiscal deficits: Although the end effect is expansionary monetary policy – as just 
described – the cause can be political rather than prudent economic management. 
When facing a fiscal deficit, a government has four options: It can (i) cut spending, 
(ii) increase taxes, (iii) borrow and/or (iv) print new money to purchase government 
securities (IOUs). In a situation where firing civil servants or increasing taxes is 
 
 
 
 
 
45 The discussion on causes and impacts of inflation draws from the following resources: Hall, R. (ed.) (1983) Inflation: 
Causes and Effects. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press; Donovan, P. (2015). The Truth about Inflation. 
New York City: Routledge; and Ha, J., Ayhan Kose, M. and F. Ohnsorge (eds.) (2019). Inflation in Emerging and Developing 
Economies Evolution, Drivers, and Policies. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 undesirable, and markets are no longer willing to lend, a government may find itself at 
the mercy of the lender of last resort (the central bank). The exchange rate regime will 
dictate the timing but, ultimately, the printing of new money to finance a deficit will result 
in inflation. This was the main source of the most egregious bouts of inflation   in ESAR 
in recent years, which include Zimbabwe – the annual inflation rate of which was 
estimated at around 500 billion (yes billion!) per cent in 200846 – and South Sudan 
– where annual inflation peaked above 400 per cent in 2016.47 
 
• Growing consumer confidence: When unemployment is low and wages are stable, 
consumers tend to become more confident and, hence, more inclined to spend 
money. This confidence drives up prices as manufacturers and providers charge more 
for goods and services that are in high demand, like housing. 
• Inflationary expectations: If inflation is already prevailing in an economy, the 
expectation of further inflation can become an overriding concern in the consciousness 
of consumers and businesses. When such expectations start to influence economic 
decisions, inflation can persist even long after the initial cause has dissipated. This 
certainly played a role in past and current inflation episodes in South Sudan and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Cost-push inflation, on the other hand, occurs when the costs of production go up, such 
as for labour and raw materials, or conversely, when the level of supply falls. If demand 
remains the same, either trend will increase the price of final goods and services that are 
affected. Some common examples are provided below. 
• Rising commodity prices: When the prices of basic commodities used in production 
processes, like oil and steel, go up, virtually all businesses see some rise in their costs. 
In turn, these are typically passed on to consumers through higher prices. For example, 
all ESAR economies were heavily impacted by the rise in global commodity prices 
during the food, fuel and financial shocks (the so-called triple ‘F’ crisis) in 2008-09.48 
• Extreme natural events: Adverse weather conditions (e.g. droughts, floods, freezing 
weather) and natural disasters (e.g. hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis) can disrupt 
supply chains and reduce agricultural output. When fewer items are available in an 
economy, prices naturally rise. The prolonged rains and dry spells that battered many 
ESAR countries in 2015-16 attest to the region’s vulnerability to recurring weather 
phenomena like El Niño and La Niña. 
• Tax policies: When a government decides to apply taxes on specific products, like 
alcohol, cigarettes or petroleum, or increase value added or sales tax rates, prices 
go up. For instance, the 140 per cent hike on fuel taxes in Zimbabwe in January 2019 
propelled inflation and instigated a series of mass protests and violence.49 
• Monopolies: When one or more companies control an industry, cost-push inflation can 
result if they reduce production to meet profit goals. This was the cause of one of the 
most notorious inflationary periods in history, when the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries restricted oil output in 1973, leading to a quadrupling of oil prices on 
global markets. 
 
Higher real wages and currency devaluation are two other common examples that drive 
 
 
46 IMF (2009). Public Information Notice: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2009 Article IV Consultation with Zimbabwe. 
47 World Bank (2017). South Sudan Economic Update: Taming the Tides of High Inflation – Policy Options for South Sudan. 
Washington, DC. 
48 Ortiz, I. and Cummins, M. (eds.) (2012). A Recovery for All: Rethinking Socio-Economic Policies for Children and Poor 
Households. New York City: UNICEF. 
49 Bearak, M. (2019). Zimbabwe’s President Raised Fuel Prices Above $12 a Gallon and then Jetted Off to Russia – Deadly 
Chaos Ensued. Washington Post, 15 January. 
 both demand-pull and cost-push inflation. On the wage front, when workers have enough 
leverage to force through remuneration increases (e.g. through collective bargaining), 
companies commonly pass the rising production costs on to consumers, which generates 
cost-push inflation. At the same time, demand-pull inflation is also created as higher 
wages cause both incomes and spending to increase. Currency devaluation, by contrast, 
takes place when a country moves from a fixed to a floating exchange rate regime or if the 
central bank purchases foreign currency which increases the supply of local currency. In 
either case, domestic goods and services become cheaper to foreign buyers, increasing 
aggregate demand, while the cost of importing foreign goods and services also increases 
(also known as imported inflation). 
 
5.2 Impacts of inflation 
 
Inflation has a wide variety of impacts, some good but mostly bad . To provide a holistic 
perspective of changing prices, this section first looks at two potential benefits of inflation, 
which could be achieved over a short-term period. This is followed by a discussion of the 
many downsides to rising prices, which are especially relevant when considering a longer- 
term horizon and the impact on the vulnerable households. The section then concludes by 
describing the winners and losers from inflation. 
 
5.2.1. The positive 
 
• Higher economic growth: A predictable response to declining purchasing power is to 
buy or invest today rather than waiting for tomorrow, as cash is losing its value. At 
least in the short term, the boost to spending and investment can lead to economic 
growth. By the same token, inflation’s negative correlation with unemployment (see 
below) implies a tendency to put more people to work, which could also have a positive 
impact on growth over the near term. 
• Lower unemployment: There is some evidence of an inverse relationship between 
unemployment and inflation, which is known as the Phillips curve. This can occur 
since wages tend to change slowly in response to structural economic shifts, like rising 
prices. However, this benefit does not hold during prolonged periods, which usually 
results in stagflation (simultaneous high levels of inflation and unemployment). 
 
5.2.2. The negative 
 
• Erosion of purchasing power: Inflation means that a person’s money – both cash in 
hand and savings in the bank – can buy fewer and fewer things over time. 
• Less effective government programmes: Inflation reduces the real value of tax revenue 
and hence limits the government’s ability to maintain the same quantity and quality of 
goods and services. This can be especially relevant to social protection programmes 
that involve cash, subsidies or in-kind goods like food. Even in low inflation contexts, 
the impact of social protection benefits can be significantly reduced over time unless 
they are indexed (adjusted) to changing price levels. 
• Higher income inequality: A host of studies examine the effects of inflation on the 
distribution of income within countries. In inflationary contexts, income inequality tends 
to decrease at first and then reverse, with the worst outcomes observed in countries that 
do not have well-developed financial sectors, which is the case in nearly all of ESAR.50 
 
 
50 Siami-Namini, S. and Hudson, D. (2019). Inflation and Income Inequality in Developed and Developing Countries. 
Journal of Economic Studies; and Ghossoub, E. and Reed, R. (2017). Financial Development, Income Inequality and the 
Redistributive Effects of Monetary Policy. Journal of Development Economics, vol. 126, pp. 167-189. 
 • More inflation… and empty shelves: When confronted by fast-rising prices, the urge to 
spend and invest tends to generate additional inflation. As people and businesses start 
spending faster and faster, the economy finds itself awash in cash that nobody wants. 
When hyperinflation sets in (i.e. when the monthly inflation rate exceeds 50 per cent51), a 
common response is for businesses and households to use their money to store up on 
basic supplies, like food, which leaves supermarkets and other stores barren. 
• Higher borrowing costs: A normal central bank reaction to rising prices is to reduce 
the money supply, which increases interest rates. This, in turn, makes borrowing more 
expensive for households, businesses and the government. 
• Lower growth and employment: As mentioned under the positives, economists have 
struggled to explain stagflation (high inflation, high unemployment and slow economic 
growth). Such a situation was once fancied impossible as it contradicted the inverse 
relationship between unemployment and inflation described by the Phillips curve. 
However, stagflation became a reality for many economies following the 1973 oil embargo 
and continues to be a threat to ESAR countries, especially commodity exporters.52 
• Weaker currency value: Under a flexible exchange rate regime, high inflation will 
cause the local currency to lose value vis-à-vis foreign currencies. Import-dependent 
economies, which characterize ESAR, will thus be forced to spend a larger amount 
of domestic currency to pay for many goods and services, which can impact the 
availability of basic things like food and medicine. 
• “Menu” costs: Rising prices also have tangible business costs, especially for those who 
would need to periodically update their prices. Common examples include printing new 
restaurant menus and updating prices in vending machines and print catalogues. 
 
 
5.2.3. Winners and losers 
 
At the end of the day, when price levels go up some people gain and some people lose. 
This depends on the nature of inflation as well as whether the inflation was expected or 
unexpected. A brief summary of how inflation affects different categories of persons is 
provided below. 
• Creditors and debtors: When debts like mortgages, commercial business loans, and 
government bonds (non-inflation-indexed) are fixed, borrowers gain and lenders lose 
because the repayment in real terms (today’s money) is worth less than the amount 
borrowed. 
• Savers: Inflation destroys the purchasing power of money that sits in a savings 
account, unspent. 
• Salary and wage earners: Anyone earning a fixed income is damaged by inflation as 
their income stream purchases fewer things. 
• Beneficiaries of government programmes: Persons and households who receive 
monetary benefits from the government (e.g. cash transfers and pensions) stand to 
lose if the amounts are not indexed to changing price levels, which is the case for 
most ESAR countries. At the same time, persons who rely on public services (e.g. 
health, education and transportation) will be adversely affected as rising prices limit 
the government’s delivery capacity (e.g. budgets can purchase fewer medical supplies 
or fuel). 
 
 
51 Defined in Cagan, P. (1956). The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation. In Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, 
Friedman, M., Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
52 Papadavid, P. (2017). Why ‘Stagflation’ Matters for Africa’s Economic Transformation. ODI briefing paper. 
 5.3 General price trends 
 
ESAR has been characterized by heavy inflation volatility for nearly two decades. The most 
common way to measure inflation is through the consumer price index (CPI), which tracks 
the price level of a weighted basket of goods and services in the economy. When looking 
back at CPI trends since 2001, the first major uptick appears in 2008 when the effects of 
the triple “F” crisis took hold in the region. Between 2007 and 2008, the average inflation 
rate in the region leaped from 4 to 22 per cent (Figure 5.01). General price levels quickly 
receded and eventually bottomed out at an average of around 6 per cent in 2014. However, 
from that point prices again quickly escalated, reaching close to 30 per cent, on average, 
in 2016. Since then, inflation eased to 17 per cent in 2017, on average, and further fell to 10 
per cent in 2018, where it is projected to hover in 2019. Starting in 2020, initial projections 
indicate that inflation may hover in the 6-7 per cent range going forward. 
 
Beyond general price instability, ESAR is home to some of the highest inflation rates in the 
world. When looking at CPI projections for all countries in 2019, 7 of the top 23 are from 
ESAR (Figure 5.02 – the countries highlighted in red). With prices expected to increase by 
more than 70 per cent, Zimbabwe will likely experience the fastest price rises in the world 
in 2019, trailing only Venezuela’s 10,000,000 per cent projection. Other ESAR countries that 
feature at the top of the global list include South Sudan (24 per cent) and Angola (17 per 
cent), with Eritrea, Ethiopia, Malawi and Zambia at around 10 per cent. 
 
The high inflation rates are largely due to economic mismanagement. Over the 2016- 18 
period, the average annual inflation rate for ESAR was close to 20 per cent, although this 
falls to around 8 per cent if excluding South Sudan (Figure 5.03). The causes can   be largely 
attributed to poor fiscal management and monetary controls. While good fiscal management 
reduces or delays expenditure during periods of rising prices, good 
 
Figure 5.01. Inflation trends in ESAR, 2001-20 
(annual percentage change of consumer price indices, regional average) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
Notes: Data unavailable for Somalia; based on average annual consumer price index values (not end of period). 
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Figure 5.02. Countries with the highest inflation rates in the world, 2019 projections 
(annual percentage change of consumer price indices) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
Notes: Red indicates ESAR countries; based on average annual consumer price index values (not end of period). 
 
 
Figure 5.03. Inflation trends in ESAR countries, 2013-21 3-year period averages 
(annual percentage change of consumer price indices) 
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Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
Notes: Data unavailable for Somalia; based on average annual consumer price index values (not end of period). 
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 monetary control adjusts the supply of money – and hence interest rates and exchange 
rates – to contain inflation. This, however, has not characterized economic policies in many 
ESAR countries.53 
 
Nonetheless, the near-term inflation outlook for the region leaves room for optimism. 
Projections for the next three years (2019-21) indicate a moderate reduction to 8 per cent, 
on average (see also Figure 5.03). The IMF attributes this regional trend to falling food and 
oil prices, which are discussed below.54 South Sudan is expected to experience the largest 
price decline, with inflation falling from nearly 220 per cent over the 2016-18 period, on 
average, to less than 20 per cent over the 2019-21 period. Angola, Malawi and Mozambique 
are also projected to undergo strong price stabilization, with inflation dropping by around 
10 per cent, on average, when comparing the same periods. Overall, 12 of 20 countries 
are forecast to experience lower inflation in 2019-21 than in 2016-18. The major outlier is 
Zimbabwe, where inflation is forecast to average around 30 per cent in 2019-21, which 
marks a dramatic increase after averaging 3 per cent during 2016-18. The other exceptions 
include Botswana, Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea, Lesotho, Rwanda and Zambia, where price 
levels are likely to undergo very minor upticks – less than 1 per cent over the two periods. 
 
Several countries do, however, have dangerous inflation outlooks. Beyond Zimbabwe, as 
already discussed, there are price change concerns in Zambia (annual average inflation rate 
of 11 per cent over the 2019-21 period), Angola (12 per cent) and South Sudan (17 per cent). 
With projections in the 8-9 per cent range, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Malawi could also 
quickly experience rapid price escalation in the event of economic mismanagement or an 
unexpected shock. 
 
5.4 Food price trends 
 
As in general prices, ESAR is also characterized by significant food price movements . 
Between 2006 and 2008, the triple “F” crisis drove food inflation from 8 per cent to 21 per 
cent, on average (Figure 5.04). Following a fall to 5 per cent in 2010, on average, food 
inflation edged back up and remained around 15 per cent in 2011-12 before returning to 5 per 
cent in 2013-14. From that point, however, regional average food prices soared to 33 per 
cent in 2016, before receding to 20 per cent in 2017 and further dropping to 5 per cent in 
2018. 
 
Food price inflation has been especially high in recent years. If looking at the past three- 
year period (2016-18), in 24 cases annual food prices grew in double figures. Moreover, six 
countries have seen annual food inflation of between 20 and 30 per cent since 2012 (Figure 
5.05). This includes Ethiopia and the United Republic of Tanzania in 2012, Malawi in 2015 
and 2016, Mozambique and Zambia in 2016, and Angola and Burundi in 2017. Two countries 
have also experienced food price increases between 30 and 40 per cent: Ethiopia in 2011 
and Angola in 2016. Finally, in South Sudan food prices nearly quadrupled in 2016 and 
doubled in 2017. 
 
Fortunately, food price volatility has come under control in most countries in the region. 
Average annual growth of food prices for the region amounted to a modest 5 per cent in 
2018, falling to 3 per cent if South Sudan is excluded (Figure 5.06). However, food price 
inflation remained high (at 12-15 per cent) in some countries, including Angola, Ethiopia 
and Malawi. Nearly reaching 40 percent, South Sudan also continued to experience high 
increases in food prices, although this marked a significant improvement from the 375 per 
cent annual change recorded just two years prior. 
 
53 Leibfritz, W. (2015). Fiscal Policy in Africa. In The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics: Volume 2: Policies and 
Practices. Monga C. and Lin, J. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
54 IMF (2018). Regional Economic Outlook: Domestic Resource Mobilization and Private Investment. Washington, DC. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Figure 5.04. Food inflation trends in ESAR, 2004-18 
(annual percentage change of food price indices, regional average) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on FAOSTAT monthly food CPI database (February 2019 release). 
Notes: Excludes data for Eritrea and Somalia, which are unavailable; based on average annual food price index values (not end of period); 
annual sample size varies from 8 to 17 countries. 
 
 
Figure 5.05. Food inflation trends in select ESAR countries, 2011-18 
(annual percentage change of food price indices) 
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Source: FAOSTAT monthly food CPI database (February 2019 release). 
Note: Based on average annual food price index values (not end of period) 
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Figure 5.06. Food inflation trends in ESAR countries, 2018 
(annual percentage change of food price indices) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FAOSTAT monthly food CPI database (February 2019 release). 
Notes: Data unavailable for Comoros, Eritrea and Somalia; based on average annual food price index values (not end of period). 
 
 
5.5 Commodity price trends 
 
Barring any major unexpected supply shocks, the stable near-term outlook for global 
commodity prices should minimize cost-push inflation forces in ESAR. In the aftermath 
of the triple “F” crisis, the global prices of key commodities were jumping by as much as 
50 per cent in real terms in 2010 and 2011 (Figure 5.07). Since then, however, price 
volatility has steadily waned. Despite a minor uptick in 2017, the global prices of key 
commodities, including food, agricultural raw materials, metals and petroleum, showed 
limited movement in 2018. Moreover, the latest projections suggest that this trend is likely 
to continue over the near term. 
 
5.6 Inflation and social transfers 
 
In ESAR, beneficiaries of cash transfer programmes have been heavily affected by 
inflation. As discussed earlier, if benefit sizes are not indexed to price changes, the impact 
of the income support can quickly diminish. One possible way to look at the inflationary 
impacts is to simply adjust the nominal value of a benefit by price changes and observe 
any differences over time. When doing this to nine social welfare programmes that provide 
cash to children and/or vulnerable families in ESAR, the inflationary effects become 
increasingly powerful over time (Figure 5.08). For example, the real value of benefits after 
the first five years (i.e. in year 6) fell by around 17 per cent in Botswana and Rwanda and 
by more than 20 per cent in Lesotho, Namibia and the United Republic of Tanzania. 
 
Importantly, the erosion of the value of social transfers amplifies over time. After ten years 
(i.e. in year 11), the real value of transfers in these nine programmes was about 25 per cent 
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Figure 5.07 Global commodity price trends, 2010-20 
(annual percentage change of commodity price indices in US$ terms) 
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Source: IMF Primary Commodity Price Forecasts. 
 
 
Figure 5.08. Changes in the real value of cash transfers in nine programmes 
in ESAR after 5, 10 and 12 years (where available) (as % of original value) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on nominal benefit values collected by UNICEF country offices in 2018 from the following programmes 
– Botswana (National Orphan Care Programme, 2013-17), Lesotho (Child Grants Programme for households with 1-2 children, 2010-17), 
Malawi (Social Cash Transfer, 2010-17), Namibia (Vulnerable Child Grants, 2001-18), Rwanda (Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme, Direct 
Support, 2009-17), South Africa (Child Support Grant Program, 2001-2020), United Republic of Tanzania (Productive Social Safety Net, 
2012-18), Zambia (Social Cash Transfer, 2010-17) and Zimbabwe (Harmonized Cash Transfer Programme, 2012-17) – and CPI data from IMF 
World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
 less than the original value, on average, and as much as 32 per cent when omitting South 
Africa (the major outlier, discussed below). Although the sample size decreases, going an 
additional two years (i.e. in year 13) shows that the real decline further deepens to around 
40 per cent of the original value, on average, also when removing South Africa. Here, the 
real value of transfers was around 30 per cent less than the original values in Malawi and 
Zambia, more than 40 per cent less in Lesotho and Rwanda, and more than 50 per cent less 
in Namibia. 
 
Most governments in the region do not routinely adjust social transfers. In fact, the 
values have never been changed in five of the nine programmes examined,55 while in 
Namibia, the values were increased just once after 17 years.56 In contrast, Malawi, South 
Africa and Zambia have periodically enlarged the transfer amounts of their programmes.57 
Here, South Africa stands as the true exception, as it has systematically adjusted the Child 
Support Grant Program on an annual or biannual basis since it was first introduced in 
1998. It is also noteworthy that Lesotho approved a change in the value in 2017, but this has 
not yet been implemented due to budget constraints. 
 
However, where transfers are adjusted, there is evidence that beneficiaries have been 
safeguarded from inflationary impacts. When comparing the “adjusters” and “non- 
adjusters,” the difference is striking (Figure 5.09). After five years (i.e. in year 6), the adjusted 
values were worth 15 per cent more than the original values in real terms, on average, while 
the non-adjusted transfers were worth nearly 20 per cent less than their original value. Going 
further out in time, after ten years (i.e. in year 11) the real value of adjusted transfers was 
nearly identical to the original values, on average, with the non- adjusted transfers having 
lost around 40 per cent of the original value. 
 
5.7 Takeaways 
 
Key trends 
 
o ESAR economies have experienced both demand-pull and cost-push inflation, but 
have remained particularly vulnerable to fiscal deficits, global commodity price 
movements and extreme natural events. 
o The region hosts some of the highest inflation rates in the world mainly due to 
economic mismanagement, but the outlook for most countries should be increasing 
price stability. 
o Nonetheless, several countries are facing dangerous inflationary situations, including 
Angola, Burundi, South Sudan and Zimbabwe, while half a dozen others remain a poor 
decision or small shock away. 
o Food inflation tends to be higher than overall inflation across the region. 
 
o Since peaking in 2016, changes in food prices have fallen significantly, but remained 
high in Angola, Ethiopia, Malawi and South Sudan. 
 
 
55 The value of the National Orphan Care Programme in Botswana was maintained at Pula 780 from 2013-17; the Child 
Grants Programme (for households with 1-2 children) in Lesotho at Loti 1,440 from 2010-17; the Vision 2020 Umurenge 
Programme, Direct Support in Rwanda at Franc 252,000 from 2009-17; the Productive Social Safety Net in the United 
Republic of Tanzania at Shillings 120,000 from 2012-18; and the Harmonized Cash Transfer Programme in Zimbabwe at an 
average of US$150 annually from 2012-17. 
56 The value of the Vulnerable Child Grants was Namibian dollar 2,400 from 2001 to 2017 and increased to Namibian dollar 
3,000 in 2018. 
57 Malawi increased the value of the Social Cash Transfer four times in a 5-year period, going from Kwacha 12,000 in 2012 
to 42,000 in 2016; South Africa has repeatedly increased the value of the Child Support Grant Programme, with benefits 
steadily rising from Rand 1,200 in 2001 to 5,160 in 2020, which has already been determined; and Zambia increased the 
value of its Social Cash Transfer three times in a 7-year period, going from Kwacha 300 in 2011 to 545 in 2017. 
  
 
Figure 5.09. The real value of cash transfers in 9 social programmes in ESAR, 
year 1 to year 20 (where available) (year 1 = 100, which is the first year for 
which data are available for each programme) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on benefit values from nine social transfer programmes (see Figure 5.08 for details) and CPI data from IMF 
World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
Notes: Year 1 reflects the first year for which benefit values are available for each programme; Data points for the final 2-4 years for each programme 
are based on projections, which include maintaining the latest available nominal benefit value and then adjusting by the IMF’s CPI forecasts. 
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 o The near-term outlook for commodity prices should alleviate the potential for 
external forces to significantly affect domestic prices. 
o Inflation has severely affected the impact of social transfers in many countries in the 
region, although several governments have successfully protected beneficiaries by 
periodically adjusting the values upward. 
 
Implications for children 
 
o The physical and cognitive health of unborn fetuses, infants and young children is 
acutely threated by rising food prices, as children and pregnant and lactating women eat 
fewer meals, smaller quantities and less nutritious foods.58 
o Higher food prices also increase the cost of government-sponsored food assistance 
and subsidy programmes, which can further endanger the nutritional intake of 
vulnerable children.59 
o General rising price levels can hinder the delivery of government programmes that 
benefit children, including through losses in the real value of income transfers 
directed to families as well as reduced access and/or lower quality of health, education and 
other social services.60 
o High inflation environments erode the income of working families, which means that 
they are less able to afford nutritious meals, medical services and products, school and 
transportation fees, and other critical items that ensure child well-being.61 
o Coping mechanisms in response to fast-rising prices may also force children into paid 
or unpaid work activities, leave them with less time to study or cause them to drop out 
of school altogether.62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 Ortiz, I., Chai, J. and Cummins, M. (2011). Escalating Food Prices: The Threat to Poor Households and Policies to 
Safeguard a Recovery for All. UNICEF Social and Economic Policy Working Paper; Woldemichael, A., Kidane, D. and 
Shimeles, A. (2017). A Tax on Children? The Effects of Food Price Inflation on Child Health. Working Paper Series No. 276, 
African Development Bank. 
59 Scott-Villiers, P. et al. (2016). Precarious Lives: Food, Work and Care After the Global Food Crisis. Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies; Scott-Villiers, P. and Kelbert, A. (editors) (2015). Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility. IDS Bulletin, vol. 
46, issue 6; and Overseas Development Institute (2008). Understanding the Impact of Food Prices on Children. London: 
Plan United Kingdom. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6. 
THE FISCAL BALANCE OUTLOOK 
AND CHILDREN 
 
 
This chapter assesses the fiscal balance in ESAR or, in other words, the relationship 
between government budgets, income streams and debt, and how these factors can affect 
investments in children’s services. It starts by looking at the size of government expenditure 
to understand both the potential for government investment to impact children and how 
this varies across countries. It then examines recent revenue trends, including taxes, to 
better understand the income-generation capacity of governments and how this varies 
across the region. Recent borrowing trends and debt build-up are analysed next to offer 
a picture of debt sustainability and future borrowing capacity across the region, which is 
followed by a review of recent and projected official development assistance (ODA) flows. 
The chapter concludes by summarizing the key expenditure, revenue and debt trends in 
ESAR, along with the implications for children. 
 
6.1 Expenditure 
 
General government expenditure is the sum of all central, state and local government 
consumption, investment and transfers in a given year. To normalize the value and allow 
for comparison across countries, total expenditure is measured over a 12-month period and 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. One important distinction in ESAR is that governments 
use a variety of fiscal calendars. While ten countries follow the traditional calendar year (1 
January to 31 December), five countries use a 1 April to 31 March schedule (Botswana, 
Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa) while another five countries follow 1 July   to 
30 June (Kenya, Malawi, South Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania); 
Ethiopia’s fiscal year runs from 8 July to 7 July. 
 
In ESAR, government budgets are expected to equal around 27 per cent of GDP in 2019, 
on average. At country level, forecasts range from 11 per cent in Zimbabwe to 47 per cent 
in Lesotho (Figure 6.01). Applying the analytical approach used in Chapter 2 to better 
understand GDP performance across countries, there is almost no difference between the 
average level of spending when comparing resource- and non-resource-intensive 
economies (27.2 versus 27.6 per cent of GDP respectively, on average). However, there is a 
wide range within both groups, from 20 per cent or less in Angola, Ethiopia, Madagascar, 
the United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe to 34 per cent or more in Eswatini, Lesotho, 
Namibia, South Africa and South Sudan. 
 
Assessing general government expenditure in per capita terms reveals significant 
differences across the region. Specifically, resource-intensive economies are projected to 
spend more than three times as much as non-resource-intensive economies in 2019 
(US$1,035 versus US$345 per capita) (Figure 6.02). This is largely due to the massive gap 
in income levels between the groups. At nearly US$2,600 per capita, Botswana has the 
highest expenditure per capita, close to 40 times greater than the lowest spender: Burundi 
at US$70 per capita. Whereas Namibia and South Africa are also projected to have per 
capita expenditure higher than US$2,100, expenditure in Madagascar, Malawi and South 
Sudan is expected to be US$100 or less on a per capita basis. Other governments that have 
very low levels of investment potential include Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe, which are projected to spend between US$155 and US$175 per person in 2019. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 6.01. General government total expenditure in ESAR countries, 2019 (as % of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
Note: Data unavailable for Somalia. 
 
 
Figure 6.02. General government total expenditure per capita in ESAR countries, 2019 (in 
current US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
Note: Data unavailable for Somalia. 
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 Government expenditure can be financed by a combination of domestic revenue, donor 
funding and borrowing. Domestic revenue generally makes up the largest share of income 
for governments but donor funding and borrowing also contribute to budgets in ESAR, 
especially in fragile countries. These topics are addressed in the following sections. 
 
6.2 Revenue 
 
General government revenue in ESAR performs moderately well. When comparing all 
revenue streams, including taxes, non-tax revenue, social contributions and grants, the 
regional average is just a few percentage points behind the average for all emerging market 
countries (23 versus 26 per cent, on average).63 Average revenue in ESAR also does 
significantly better than the group of Sub-Saharan countries (18.4 per cent, on average) but 
lags far behind advanced economies (36 per cent, on average).64 
 
At the country level, however, revenue performance is quite diverse. For instance, Lesotho 
and South Sudan are projected to have very high revenue-to-GDP ratios in 2019 (41.7 and 
42.7 per cent respectively) (Figure 6.03). At around 28.5 per cent of GDP, Comoros is also 
doing well given its low per capita income, as are Malawi and Mozambique at around 27 per 
cent of GDP. In contrast, Eritrea (14.9 per cent), the United Republic of Tanzania (15.5 per 
cent), Madagascar (15.9 per cent) and Uganda (16.1 per cent) are characterized by relatively 
low revenue-to-GDP ratios, which force them to borrow heavily in order to finance their 
current levels of expenditure. Driven by political and economic instability, Zimbabwe 
emerges as the worst performer in the region, with general government revenue forecast 
 
63 Based on 2019 projections from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
64 Ibid. 
 
Figure 6.03. General government revenue in ESAR countries, 2019 (as % of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
Note: Data unavailable for Somalia. 
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 at 8.8 per cent of GDP in 2019. At less than 14 per cent of GDP, Burundi and Ethiopia round 
out the bottom, where conflict and instability have hampered revenue collection efforts. 
 
Taxes account for more than three-quarters of revenue in ESAR, but there is mixed 
evidence that tax collection capacity has improved over time. Looking at the latest data, 
taxes constituted 79 per cent of total revenue or about 20 per cent of GDP, on average 
(Figure 6.04). Country figures range from just over 50 per cent in Angola, Burundi and 
Ethiopia to close to 100 per cent in Eswatini, Namibia and South Africa. Although historical 
data on tax revenue is scarce for the region, seven countries do have estimates that enable 
comparison of trends between 2005 and 2015. Every country that belongs to the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU), except Botswana, marked sizable improvements in tax 
revenue as a percentage of GDP, while the two non-SACU countries – Angola and 
Madagascar – both experienced steep declines in tax and overall revenue in terms of GDP 
(Figure 6.05). The IMF estimates that the region could increase tax collection by 3 to 5 per 
cent of GDP if governments strengthened governance measures, improved tax collection 
efficiencies and combatted corruption.65 
 
6.3 Borrowing 
 
Where revenue and donor funding are insufficient to meet expenditure needs, governments 
require additional financing. Borrowing to finance projects that generate positive returns 
to the economy and increase future revenue flows is considered sustainable. Borrowing to 
finance increased expenditure to stabilize or stimulate the economy over the short term is 
also justifiable, if combined with debt repayments when the economy improves. 
 
65 IMF (2018). Regional Economic Outlook: Domestic Resource Mobilization and Private Investment. Washington, DC. 
 
Figure 6.04. Tax and other government revenue in ESAR countries, 
2016 or latest available (as % of GDP and % of total revenue) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019) for data on total revenue and IMF, 
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook and data files, and World Bank estimates for data on tax revenue. 
Note: Data unavailable for Comoros, Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan. 
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Figure 6.05. Tax and other government revenue trends in select ESAR countries, 2005 
and 2015 or latest available (as % of GDP and % of total revenue) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019) for data on total revenue and IMF, Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook and data files, and World Bank estimates for data on tax revenue. 
 
However, when government expenditure constantly exceeds revenue, debt can quickly 
accumulate and spiral out of control. This increases the vulnerability of the economy as 
well as the share of the budget directed to interest payments, which crowds out spending 
on other things, including programmes that benefit children. 
 
ESAR governments rely heavily on borrowing to finance their budgets. In 2019, revenue 
is expected to account for around 80 per cent of total expenditure as a regional average, 
with the other 20 per cent from borrowing (Figure 6.06). There is a notable difference in 
resource-intensive economies, which are financing 13 per cent of their spending, on 
average, compared to 21 per cent in non-resource-intensive economies. Projections indicate 
that every government in the region will run a budget deficit in 2019 except Angola and South 
Sudan, which has been the norm since 2013 with very few exceptions. Beyond Angola and 
South Sudan, Comoros and Malawi are the only countries that are expected to finance less 
than 10 per cent of their budgets in 2019. In contrast, borrowing will cover 40 per cent of 
spending in Burundi and nearly 50 per cent in Eritrea. 
 
6.4 Debt and future borrowing capacity 
 
Continuous budget deficits have led to rapid debt accumulation in recent years . When 
looking at general government gross debt, which captures all liabilities that require payments 
to creditors in the future, the regional debt burden soared from an average of 36 per cent of 
GDP in 2012 to 55 per cent of GDP in 2016 (Figure 6.07). Debt build up was particularly 
aggressive in resource-intensive economies, which doubled between 2012 and 2016 
compared to a 30 per cent rise in non-resource-intensive economies. Since 2016, the growth 
of new debt has slowed across the region and is forecast to average 56 per cent of GDP in 
2019. However, there are two distinct patterns. In resource-intensive economies, 
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Figure 6.06. General government revenue and borrowing in ESAR 
countries, 2019 (as % of GDP and % of total expenditure) 
 
 
50 
45 
40 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Revenue Borrowing 
 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
Note: Data unavailable for Somalia. 
 
 
Figure 6.07. General government gross debt trends in 
ESAR, 2010-21 (as % of GDP, regional averages) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
Note: Excludes Somalia due to data unavailability. 
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 debt levels are projected at around 49 per cent of GDP in 2019, which should remain stable 
over the near term. In contrast, debt has continued to climb in non-resource-intensive 
economies. This is expected to be around 61 per cent of GDP in 2019 and to continue to 
increase over the near term albeit moderately. 
 
The growth in debt has been extraordinary in a third of the region. Between 2011-12 and 
2019, general gross government debt increased by more than 100 per cent in Namibia, by 
180 per cent in Eswatini and Rwanda, by close to 250 per cent in Angola, Mozambique and 
Zambia, and a whopping 7.5-fold in South Sudan (Figure 6.08). Based on 2019 projections, 
Mozambique and Eritrea are among the countries in the world with the ten highest debt- to-
GDP ratios (at 125 and 127 per cent of GDP respectively), while Botswana has the fourth 
lowest level (just under 13 per cent of GDP). 
 
Unsurprisingly, debt distress is becoming commonplace. Of the 15 countries in the region 
that have recently had debt sustainability assessments (DSAs) carried out by the IMF, four 
were in debt distress: Eritrea, Mozambique, South Sudan and Zimbabwe (Figure 6.09). 
Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia and Zambia were also considered at high risk of debt distress. 
 
Another troubling trend is that growing debt has been accompanied by less favourable 
borrowing conditions. Across ESAR, the proportion of external debt that is issued on 
concessional terms fell from a high of 67 per cent in 2005 to 55 per cent in 2017, based on 
the average of countries with data (Figure 6.10). While the level of debt gives an indication 
of economic vulnerability, the composition of debt also matters. Other things being equal,  a 
country can carry a higher level of concessional debt compared to debt issued on market 
terms, given the lower (or absent) interest rates, repayment grace periods and/or long 
 
 
 
Figure 6.08. General gross government debt trends in ESAR 
countries, 2011-12 period averages and 2019 (as % of GDP) 
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Note: Data unavailable for Somalia. 
Resource intensive Non-resource intensive  
B
o
ts
w
a
n
a
 
Z
im
b
a
b
w
e
 
T
an
za
n
ia
 
So
u
th
 S
u
d
a
n
 
N
am
ib
ia
 
So
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
Z
am
b
ia
 
A
n
g
o
la
 
C
o
m
o
ro
s 
L
e
so
th
o
 
M
a
d
a
g
a
sc
a
r 
E
sw
a
ti
n
i 
U
g
a
n
d
a
 
R
w
a
n
d
a
 
K
e
n
ya
 
Et
h
io
p
ia
 
M
a
la
w
i 
B
u
ru
n
d
i 
M
o
za
m
b
iq
u
e
 
Er
it
re
a 
  
 
Figure 6.09. Risk of debt distress in select ESAR countries, latest available 
 
 
Source: IMF (2018). List of LIC DSAs for PRGT-Eligible Countries: Summary Note Based on a Staff Review of the Latest DSAs as of 1 
November 2018 
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Figure 6.10. Concessional debt trends in ESAR, 2000-17 (as 
% of total external debt, regional average) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank, International Debt Statistics (2018). 
Note: Excludes Namibia and South Sudan due to data unavailability. 
 
maturity periods. As of 2017, South Africa had no concessional debt, while it amounted to 
more than 80 per cent of total external debt in Comoros and Malawi and more than 90 per 
cent in Eritrea. 
 
The currency composition of debt also affects economic vulnerability. According to the 
IMF, foreign-currency-denominated debt has increased in recent years and made up an 
average of 60 per cent of total public debt in Sub-Saharan Africa countries in 2017.66 There 
is a high variation across countries, with foreign-currency-denominated debt making up 
approximately 10 per cent of total debt in South Africa and 100 per cent in Comoros and 
Zimbabwe. Although such debt generally comes with lower interest rates than debt issued 
in local currencies, it exposes borrowing countries to the risk of exchange rate volatility 
and hence sudden, large increases in repayments. 
 
Ultimately, the rapid and costlier debt build up has caused interest payments to balloon 
in many places. When combining interest payments on all government debt, including 
bonds, loans and other debt instruments to both domestic and foreign creditors, and 
comparing to government revenue, the ratio increased from 3.7 to 9.4 per cent between 2011 
and 2017, based on the average of available data (Figure 6.11). In Angola, the interest 
payment-to-revenue ratio jumped from 1.7 to 16.5 per cent over the same period, while in 
Zambia it increased from 7.6 to 26.9 per cent. Other significant increases took place in Malawi 
(from 8.4 to 18.5 per cent) and Mozambique (from 3.3 to 8.3 per cent). Of the 11 countries 
that have estimates available in 2016 or 2017, six are paying 10 per cent or more of their 
revenue toward debt repayment. And although data limitations preclude a more recent 
regional picture, the upward trend has very likely continued into the present.67 
 
66 IMF (2018). Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Economic Outlook: Domestic Resource Mobilization and Private Investment. 
Washington, DC. 
67 Ibid. 
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Figure 6.11. Interest payment-to-revenue ratio trends in ESAR, 2010-17 (regional average) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook and data files (2018). 
Note: There is limited data availability, with the sample size varying from 9 to 12 countries over the 2010-17 period. 
 
As concessional debt opportunities wane, most countries will increasingly need to rely 
on traditional financing mechanisms to meet their spending needs. A country’s ability to 
access funding from international financial markets is largely based on its sovereign credit 
rating. These are issued by credit rating agencies, which evaluate a government’s capacity 
and willingness to meet financial commitments, both in local and foreign currency and 
for different time periods. When looking at the local currency, long-term ratings from 
Standard & Poor for the nine ESAR countries that are covered, Botswana is the only one 
considered creditworthy (Table 6.01). While South Africa is close to being creditworthy, all 
other countries are viewed as having high risks, with Angola, Mozambique and Zambia 
rounding out the bottom of the list. Most countries have stable outlooks, which implies 
that their ratings are unlikely to change in the medium term. However, Rwanda’s outlook 
is positive, meaning that economic and/or business conditions could lead to a higher 
rating in the near future, while the outlooks in Angola and Zambia are negative, signalling 
potential downgrades are not off. 
 
A core challenge is that commercial financing mechanisms will not be bountiful nor cheap. 
Countries with strong sovereign credit ratings gain access to more private capital at lower 
interest rates. However, given that more than half of ESAR countries do not even have 
a rating, and most of those that have ratings are below investment grade, international 
commercial options will not be sustainable in the near term. This means that most 
governments will depend on domestic bond markets to meet their financing requirements. 
However, local bond issues typically have high interest rates and short maturities, and 
few countries in the region have well-developed financial sectors that can readily fill a 
government’s demand for cash.68 
 
 
 
68 Yibin, M., Phelps, P. and Stotsky, J. (2013). Bond Markets in Africa. IMF Working Paper No. 13/12. 
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Table 6.01. Sovereign credit ratings in ESAR countries (in 
local currency, long term), April 2019 
 
 
Country 
 
Rating 
 
Outlook 
 
Botswana 
 
A- 
 
Stable 
South Africa BB+ Stable 
Kenya B+ Stable 
Rwanda B+ Positive 
Ethiopia B Stable 
Uganda B Stable 
Mozambique B- Stable 
Angola B- Negative 
Zambia B- Negative 
Source: Standard & Poors (2019). Sovereign Ratings List (April update). 
 
 
Figure 6.12. Chinese loans to governments in ESAR, 2000-17 (in billions of current US$) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative (September 2018 version). 
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 Nonetheless, one increasingly willing financier of ESAR government borrowing needs is 
China. Between 2010 and 2017, the Ministry of Commerce, policy banks (Export-Import Bank 
of China and China Development Bank), private and commercial banks, and state- owned 
enterprises lent around US$80 billion to ESAR governments (Figure 6.12). This was a 
combination of commercial loans (market rates), various credit arrangements to facilitate the 
purchase of goods and services from Chinese suppliers or contractors,  and also financing 
that qualifies as ODA, including zero-interest and concessional loans (usually at 2 per cent 
with a 5-year grace period 10-year repayment period).69 In 2015-17, Angola accounted for 
close to 50 per cent of all new Chinese loans to the region, with other major recipients 
including Ethiopia (15 per cent), Kenya (12 per cent), Zambia (8 per cent) and South Africa 
(5 per cent). 
 
Angola aside, ESAR borrowing from China has recently slowed but should pick up. Chinese 
lending to the region gained momentum after 2008, when new loans progressively 
increased, reaching close to US$12 billion in 2013. Since then, total lending has declined, 
with the major exception of Angola, which borrowed US$19 billion in 2016 and another 
US$4 billion in 2017 to support various infrastructure projects. Nonetheless, at the Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation held in Beijing in September 2018, Chinese President Xi 
Jinping pledged US$60 billion in new development financing to sub-Saharan Africa over 
the 2019-21 period.70 This indicates that somewhere around US$10 billion of Chinese 
financing will be available each year to ESAR governments. 
 
6.5 Donor funding 
 
ODA flows to the region stagnated in recent years but appear to be rebounding. In 2017, 
the latest year of available data, total ODA to ESAR amounted to US$24 billion (in constant 
2015 US$) (Figure 6.13).71 This marks a nearly 10 per cent increase from the amount 
received in 2016 and an 18 per cent increase on 2014 levels, when ODA ebbed around 
US$20.5 billion. A simple projection approach indicates that ODA could be in the US$26-27 
billion range in 2019. 
 
Nonetheless, ODA remains heavily concentrated in a sub-set of countries. Four countries, 
in particular, absorb nearly half of total aid in the region. These are Ethiopia (17 per cent), 
the United Republic of Tanzania (11 per cent), Kenya (10 per cent) and South Sudan (9 per 
cent) (Figure 6.14). Other major recipients include Mozambique, Somalia and Uganda, each 
of which accounts for 7-8 per cent of ODA in ESAR. 
 
Donor funding remains a critical income source for many ESAR countries, but much 
less so than a decade ago. Taking the latest two-year period averages, ODA amounted to 
around 26 per cent of total general government expenditure in ESAR, on average (Figure 
6.15 – red bars). Country-level figures vary from less than 2 per cent of expenditure in 
Angola, Botswana and South Africa to more than 50 per cent in Rwanda, around 75 per cent 
in Malawi, 85 per cent in Burundi, and more than 140 per cent in South Sudan. While 
dependence on foreign aid remains significant for some countries at present, ten years ago 
ODA amounted to nearly 50 per cent of government expenditure across the region (Figure 
6.15 – blue bars); the lower figures today indicate the declining importance. 
 
 
 
 
69 Brautigam, D. and Hwang, J. (2016). China-Africa Loan Database Research Guidebook. Johns Hopkins SAIS China- 
Africa Research Initiative. 
70 Xinhuanet (2018). Beijing Declaration, Action Plan Agreed on at FOCAC Summit. 
71 ODA figures published by the OECD account for government-to-government developmental and humanitarian aid in 
the form of grants and loans, excluding private and NGO aid flows. 
  
 
Figure 6.13. Net ODA and official aid trends in ESAR, 2000-19 
(in billions of constant 2015 US$, regional total) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD International Development Statistics (IDS) online database (December 2018 update). 
Note: Projections start in 2018 based on least squares method using the latest 3-year period. 
 
 
Figure 6.14. Distribution of net ODA and official aid 
received in ESAR countries, 2016 (as % of total) 
 
 
 
Source: OECD International Development Statistics (IDS) online database (December 2018 update) 
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Figure 6.15. Ratio of ODA to total general government expenditure 
in ESAR countries, 2007-08 and 2016-17 period averages 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD International Development Statistics (IDS) online database (December 2018 update) for 
data on ODA and IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019) for data on expenditure. 
Notes: Data unavailable for Somalia; South Sudan is not presented since there is no historical data 
(the 2016-17 period average ratio is 142). 
 
Yet aid is not always directed to the neediest countries. In practice, ODA allocations are 
strongly influenced by factors like colonial history and geopolitical affiliation, rather than 
actual development needs.72 A simple plotting of poverty rates alongside ODA per capita 
values corroborates this (Figure 6.16). For example, the poverty rate in Malawi is more 
than five times greater than in Namibia, yet both countries receive similar amounts of ODA 
on a per recipient basis. Or while Angola and Comoros have comparable levels of poverty, 
Comoros receives close to 11 times the amount of ODA once accounting for the size of 
the population. Similarly, while Eswatini and Uganda have nearly identical poverty rates, 
Eswatini benefits from 2.3 times more ODA on a per capita basis. Given that 15 of the 21 
countries in ESAR are classified as least developed countries for DAC reporting through 
2020 (Table 6.02), any efforts that better direct ODA on a needs basis would likely see a 
large increase in flows to the region. 
 
Rising income levels are already altering the aid landscape in ESAR. A country’s income 
classification affects its potential to benefit from ODA, both through grants and loans. The 
African Development Bank, the African Development Fund and the World Bank all base 
their lending practices on a country’s income status. For example, as of 2019, 14 ESAR 
countries were eligible for International Development Association (IDA) grants and loans 
from the World Bank, but the number is expected to drop to just 7 by 2030 (Table 6.02). 
Gavi (the Global Vaccine Alliance) also employs a graduation policy to focus its resources 
on the poorest countries. In 2018, 16 of the 41 countries that were eligible to apply for new 
vaccine support were in ESAR (also in Table 6.02). 
 
 
 
 
72 Utz, R. (2010). Will Countries that Receive Insufficient Aid Please Stand Up? CFP Working Paper Series, No. 7, World 
Bank. 
 
  
 
Figure 6.16. Poverty rates and ODA per capita, 2016 or latest available 
(as % of population living below US$1.90/day in PPP, 2011 international US$) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD International Development Statistics (IDS) online database (December 2018 update) for 
data on ODA, UN DESA World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision (medium variant) for population data and World Bank, Development 
Research Group, PovcalNet for data on poverty headcounts. 
Note: Data unavailable for Eritrea and Somalia. 
 
The global aid system is also changing, with new donors and private organizations 
increasing their presence in the region. In some ESAR countries, non-traditional donors 
have suddenly become the largest contributors. China’s rising influence was discussed 
earlier, as for many ESAR governments it has become an important source of financing, 
some of which is classified as ODA. Although it is difficult to get precise estimates, China 
provided over US$3 billion in concessional finance globally in 2016, a large portion of 
which can be assumed to have been directed to sub-Saharan Africa and ESAR countries.73 
Similar trends also apply to India, which provided close to US$2 billion in ODA globally in 
2016, the United Arab Emirates (nearly US$5 billion in 2017) and Turkey (more than US$8 
billion in 2017),74 the latter two are especially important sources of foreign aid for countries 
with large Muslim populations. 
 
 
73 OECD (2018). Development Co-operation Report 2018: Joining Forces to Leave No One Behind. Paris. 
74 Ibid. 
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Table 6.02. Categories of ODA eligibility 
 
 
 
Country 
 
ODA in 
2018-201 
IDA (from World Bank)  
GAVI in 20182 
IBRD (World Bank) 
in 20193 in 2030 
(projected)4 
Borrow in 2019 Borrow and grant 
in 2019 
Angola X    X  
Botswana     X  
Burundi X X X X   
Comoros X X  X   
Eritrea X X  X   
Eswatini     X  
Ethiopia X X X X   
Kenya    X  X 
Lesotho X X  X   
Madagascar X X X X   
Malawi X X X X   
Mozambique X X  X   
Namibia     X  
Rwanda X X  X   
Somalia X X X X   
South Africa     X  
South Sudan X X  X   
Tanzania X X X X   
Uganda X X X X   
Zambia X X  X   
Zimbabwe    X  X 
1. These countries are classified by the OECD-DAC as least developed countries for the 2018-20 period and hence eligible for ODA. 
Source: OECD-DAC (2018). DAC List of ODA Recipients: Effective for Reporting on 2018, 2019 and 2020 Flows. 
2. Gavi The Vaccine Alliance (2018). Countries Eligible for Support. 
3. World Bank (2019). World Bank Country and Lending Groups, Fiscal Year 2018-19. 
4. Sedemund, J. (2014). An Outlook on ODA Graduation in the Post-2015 Era. Paris: OECD. 
5. OECD (2018). Development Co-operation Report 2018: Joining Forces to Leave No One Behind. Paris. 
6. Ibid. 
 
 
 
6.6 Takeaways 
 
Key trends 
 
o The potential power of government expenditure is undermined by the small size of 
formal economies in many places, especially in Burundi, Madagascar, Malawi and 
South Sudan where expenditure per capita is at or below US$100 per person. 
o With universal budget deficits forecast in 2019, ESAR governments are struggling to 
manage deficits and debt. 
o Recurring budget deficits underscore the urgency to modernize tax systems, enhance 
compliance and develop non-tax revenue streams. 
 o The region is on the brink of a debt crisis; four countries are already in debt distress 
(Eritrea, Mozambique, South Sudan and Zimbabwe), and many others are an unexpected 
shock away. 
o After slumping during the 2014-16 period, ODA flows to ESAR rebounded in 2017 
nonetheless, donor funding remains heavily concentrated in a sub-set of countries and 
could diminish significantly over the medium term as half of the current IDA-eligible 
countries graduate to MIC status. 
o The emergence of new financiers and donors in the region, including China, could 
provide opportunities for some governments if they carefully mitigate potential risks 
(e.g. asset seizure). 
 
Implications for children 
 
o For most countries in ESAR, the government is the largest source of funding for 
essential services that children need to survive and thrive. This means that the only 
viable, long-term solution to address the current financing gaps is to maximize domestic 
resource mobilization, including through sustained economic growth and improved tax 
administration. 
o At the same time, achieving meaningful progress for children in the immediate term will 
be impossible for most governments unless domestic investments are 
complemented by greater ODA flows. 
o The rapid rise of debt service payments is placing children’s services under duress in 
many places and threatening to reverse progress achieved. For example, higher debt 
repayments have caused delayed and deferred social protection payments affecting up 
to 300,000 poor households in Zambia,75 while they have starved county governments 
in Kenya of funding that is essential to deliver basic child services, including primary 
health care and pre-primary education.76 
 
 
75 Mwenge, F. (2018). Cost of Repaying High Government Debt is Hitting Ordinary Zambians as Social Sector Spending is 
Squeezed. Zambian Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR), 30 August. 
76 Ibid. 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7. 
THE SOCIAL SECTOR INVESTMENT 
OUTLOOK AND CHILDREN 
 
 
Having discussed the fiscal balance, this chapter takes a deep dive into the expenditure 
component to gauge the extent to which social sectors are being supported and how 
their budgets are performing. Each section takes on a different social sector, starting with 
health, education, and water and sanitation, and finishing with social protection. Based on 
the available cross-country data, the chapter attempts to assess the budget priority of each 
sector and changes over time, the level of spending relative to the size of the economy and 
population, the composition of budgets, including by economic classification (recurrent and 
capital items77) and different types of services, as well as budget credibility. Following the 
sector-by-sector analysis, the chapter presents – as best as possible – a bird’s eye view of 
social sector investment trends in the region. It also explores the potential effects of 
reallocating budgetary resources from other areas, like the military, into the social sectors. 
To conclude, the chapter summarizes the main social sector investment issues in the region 
along with the implications for children. 
 
7.1 Health spending 
 
Few governments in the region have lived up to their financial commitments to the health 
sector. With the signing of the Abuja Declaration in 2001, African governments unanimously 
agreed to allocate 15 per cent of their annual budgets to health.78Today, nearly two decades 
on, little progress has been achieved. The latest cross-country comparable data indicates 
that only 3 countries in ESAR are meeting the spending benchmark: Eswatini, Ethiopia and 
Malawi (Figure 7.01). Even more alarmingly, one-third of the region is devoting less than 10 
per cent of its national budgets to the health sector, with Angola, Eritrea and South Sudan 
at 5 per cent or less. Meanwhile, the WHO estimates that between 20 per cent and 40 per 
cent of health resources are misspent.79 
 
Most governments are also failing to invest the minimum amount needed to provide basic, 
life-saving health services to their populations. Using the updated WHO estimate that a 
minimum of US$86 per capita of spending is required to cover essential health services each 
year,80 14 of the 20 ESAR countries with data did not meet this target as of 2015 (Figure 7.02). 
At US$14 per capita, Madagascar has the lowest investment level in the region, while 
Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Malawi and South Sudan all spent equal to or less than US$30 
 
77 Recurrent expenditure supports ongoing operations and does not result in the creation or acquisition of fixed assets. 
This commonly includes wages, rentals, office requirements, interest payments on borrowed funds, and maintenance of 
fixed assets. Capital expenditure, in contrast, is for assets that last for more than one year. This includes things like 
equipment, land, buildings, legal expenses and other transfer costs associated with a property. Since the entire value of the 
asset is recorded in the year when it was purchased, capital spending can fluctuate significantly from year to year, especially 
when major infrastructure projects are supported. It is also important to note that recurrent expenditure sometimes 
includes capital expenditures (e.g. for equipment like computers, chalkboards or health diagnostic machines) and vice versa 
depending on how a transaction is defined and recorded by the government. 
 
78 WHO (2011). The Abuja Declaration: Ten Years On. Geneva. 
79 WHO (2014). Global Health Expenditure Atlas. Geneva. 
 
80 The World Health Report 2010 presented estimates of required health spending prepared by the High-Level Taskforce 
on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems, concluding that LICs would need to spend US$60 per capita, on 
average, by 2015 in order to deliver a set of essential health interventions, but noting that the figure would for some countries 
be less than US$40 per capita and for others more than US$80 per capita. These estimates were then independently 
updated to 2012 US dollar terms (from 2005), which resulted in an average figure of $86 per capita. 
Source: Chatham House Centre on Global Health Security Working Group on Health Financing (2014). Shared Responsibilities 
for Health: A Coherent Global Framework for Health Financing. London; see also Jowett, M. et al. (2016). Spending Targets 
for Health: No Magic Number. Health Financing Working Paper No. 1, WHO. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7.01. Government expenditure on health in ESAR countries, 2016 
or latest available (as % of total expenditure) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WHO Global Health Expenditure Database. 
Note: Data unavailable for Somalia. 
 
on health. In contrast, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa invested around US$400, 
US$500 and US$600 per capita, respectively, on the health of their populations. Another key 
observation is that two of the three countries that are abiding by the Abuja Declaration budget 
priority target fail to meet the benchmark in terms of levels of investment (US$86 per capita): 
these include Ethiopia and Malawi (US$27 and US$39 per capita respectively). 
 
To further underscore the daunting financing constraints, several governments would be 
unable to provide essential health services even if they directed all their revenue to the 
sector. Based on total revenue and population projections in 2019, four countries would 
either fall below or barely meet the US$86 per capita minimum health spending threshold 
– Burundi, Madagascar, Malawi and South Sudan – with Burundi only projected to have 
US$42 per capita in revenue in 2019, not even half of the WHO requirement (Figure 7.03 – 
dark blue bars). Under a different yet equally unrealistic scenario, if all governments in the 
region were to spend 50 per cent of their revenue base on health services, eleven countries 
would be at or below the minimum per capita financial requirement (Figure 7.03 – blue 
bars). And if governments were to meet the Abuja Declaration target by investing 15 per 
cent of their projected revenue in the health sector, only 4 of the 20 governments would 
be able to invest enough to provide essential health services to their populations in 2019 
(Botswana, Eswatini, Namibia and South Africa) (Figure 7.03 – light blue bars). 
On a more positive front, there has been progress on increasing levels of investment in 
health. Looking at changes between 2005 and 2015, per capita health spending grew by 
US$55, on average, which is a 122 per cent increase (Figure 7.04). Going from US$7 to 
US$27 per capita, Ethiopia nearly trebled its investment in health. In addition, Eritrea and 
Kenya more than doubled their health spending over the same period, while Angola and 
Rwanda were close behind. Madagascar is the only country that reversed progress, with 
per capita health expenditure slightly receding from around US$13.90 in 2005 to US$13.70 
in 2015. 
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Figure 7.02. Health expenditure per capita in ESAR countries and 
minimum investment requirements, 2015 (in current US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WHO Global Health Expenditure Database for data on health expenditure and UN DESA World 
Population Prospects: 2017 Revision for population data. 
Note: Data unavailable for Somalia. 
 
Figure 7.03. Total general government revenue per capita in ESAR 
countries and minimum health investment requirements under 
different spending scenarios, 2019 projections (in current US$) 
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019). 
Notes: Data unavailable for Somalia; for presentation purposes, the total values of countries that have high levels of per capita revenue 
are not presented in the figure (e.g. for Lesotho, Angola, Eswatini, Namibia, South Africa and Botswana). 
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Figure 7.04. Per capita health expenditure trends in ESAR countries 
between 2005 and 2015 (change in current US$ and as %) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on WHO Global Health Expenditure Database for data on health expenditure and UN DESA World 
Population Prospects: 2017 Revision for population data. 
Note: Data unavailable for Somalia and South Sudan. 
 
 
 
A closer look at the composition of health spending shows that primary services are not 
always a priority. Although there is limited cross-country information available, data from 
recent UNICEF budget briefs and other sources shows that, in seven countries, only an 
average of 20 per cent of health budgets were recently supporting primary services (Figure 
7.05). This ranges from as low as low as 8 per cent in Lesotho to 30 per cent in South Africa. 
The available data suggest that many health budgets are favouring investments in tertiary 
services that tend to benefit better-off persons living close to or inside major cities, while 
neglecting basic services that the vast majority of persons relies on. 
 
Beyond compositional issues, there are also challenges in executing health sector budgets, 
especially capital (or development) budgets. A review of recent public finance analyses in 
the region offers budget credibility data for 19 countries, which show the percentage of the 
health budget that is spent at the end of the fiscal year compared to the approved amount at 
the start of the year. When looking at the latest available three-year averages for each 
country, an average of 86 per cent of the approved health sector budget is spent (Figure 
7.06). The countries that have data on recurrent spending show that this performs better than 
the overall average (an average of 95 per cent), while capital spending fares considerably 
worse, at an average of less than 70 per cent. 
 
The differences in budget credibility across countries are also profound. For instance, the 
latest three-year average credibility rate for recurrent health budgets was at or above 100 
per cent in Botswana, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Malawi and Namibia, compared to 69 per cent in 
Lesotho. For capital expenditure, credibility was close to or above 90 per cent in Ethiopia, 
Mozambique and Namibia compared to less than 60 per cent in Kenya and Malawi and 
below 50 per cent in Botswana and Lesotho. 
   
 
 
 
    
    
  
  
  
 
 
   
  
     
 
 
Figure 7.05. Health expenditure on primary healthcare services in select ESAR 
countries, latest available (as % of total government health expenditure) 
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South Africa (FY2017)        30% 
 
 
 
Average 
 
 
Sources: UNICEF health budget briefs for all countries except the United Republic of Tanzania, which is from the Primary Health Care 
Performance Initiative (2018). 
Note: Limited data availability. 
 
 
Figure 7.06. Health budget credibility rates in ESAR countries, latest available 3-
year period averages (actual expenditure as % of approved allocation) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on UNICEF budget briefs, Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs), Public Expenditure and Financial 
Assessments (PEFAs) and World Bank BOOST databases published since 2016. 
Note: Data unavailable for Eritrea and Somalia. 
 
 7.2 Education spending 
 
Over the past two decades, ESAR governments have made big financial promises to 
the education sector. In 2000, all countries in the region signed Education for All: A 
Framework for Action in Sub-Saharan Africa – also known as the Dakar Framework. Here, 
they pledged to allocate at least 7 per cent of GDP to education by 2005 and 9 per cent by 
2010.81 As the MDG period concluded, ESAR governments re-affirmed their commitment 
to finance education services by signing the Incheon Declaration and Framework for 
Action for the implementation of SDG 4 (on education). This called for signatories to 
allocate 6 per cent of GDP and/or 15-20 per cent of public expenditure to education.82 
 
Despite the strong commitments, investment in education continues to fall short, starting 
with budget priority. Only five countries with recent comparable data had devoted 20 per 
cent or more of their budgets to education: Botswana, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Lesotho and 
Zimbabwe (Figure 7.07). Burundi and Mozambique were also within a percentage point or 
less. The more alarming trend is the declining priority given to the sector over time. Of the 
18 countries with comparable data between 2007 and 2017, ten decreased the share of total 
expenditure going to education: this was by a sizable 5.6 percentage points, on average. 
 
Underperformance continues when looking at the levels of investments in education . 
When reviewing performance against the GDP target, only six countries with comparable 
data had invested an amount equal to at least 6 per cent of their GDP in the education sector 
 
81 UNESCO (2000). The Dakar Framework for Action: Education for All – Meeting our Collective Commitments. Paris. 
82 UNESCO (2015). Incheon Declaration and SDG4 – Education 2030 Framework for Action. Paris. 
 
Figure 7.07. Government expenditure on education in ESAR countries as % 
of total expenditure, 2007 and 2017 (or latest available) 
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Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
Note: Data unavailable for Somalia. 
     
 based on the latest estimates: Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe (Figure 7.08). As in budget priority, the trend over time is also troubling.  Of the 
16 countries with estimates between 2007 and 2017, ten decreased their education 
investments relative to the size of their economy, with the average contraction amounting to 
1.7 per cent of GDP. 
 
Beyond investment shortfalls, there are also concerns around optimizing the balance 
of education budgets across different education levels and spending items. A first 
lens is the investment focus by levels of the education system. Based on the 14 ESAR 
countries that have recent, comparable data, around half of education budgets are spent 
on primary education and about a quarter each on secondary and tertiary education 
services, on average (Figure 7.09). However, pre-primary education services, which are 
foundational to ensuring that investment in higher levels is not wasted through low 
learning outcomes and high repetition and dropout rates, remain underfunded. Based 
on the sample, an average of 2.1 per cent of education spending supports pre-primary 
education, with three countries investing nothing according to available data (Malawi, 
Mozambique and Uganda). 
 
The spending imbalance can be further understood by comparing spending between 
tertiary and pre-primary services. In the 11 countries that have data, tertiary and post- 
secondary non-tertiary education services received 137 times more funding than pre- 
primary services, on average (Figure 7.10). The difference ranges from a as little as two- and 
four-fold in Comoros and Tanzania respectively to close to 500 times in South Sudan and 
900 times in Burundi. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.08. Government expenditure on education in ESAR countries as % 
of GDP, 2007 and 2017 (or latest available) 
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Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
Note: Data unavailable for Somalia. 
  
 
Figure 7.09. Government expenditure by level of education in select ESAR countries, 2017 
or latest available (as % of total government expenditure on education) 
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Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
Note: Limited data availability. 
* Includes both tertiary and post-secondary non-tertiary. 
 
 
Figure 7.10. Ratio of government investments in tertiary* and pre-primary 
education services in select ESAR countries, 2017 or latest available (as %) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
Note: Limited data availability. 
* Includes both tertiary and post-secondary non-tertiary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Additional spending imbalances are observed when looking at the economic classification 
of the education budget. In the 14 countries with recent, comparable information, around 
92 per cent of education budgets support recurrent items – mainly salaries and wages – with 
the other 8 per cent going to capital (or development) items (Figure 7.11). In Comoros and 
South Sudan, the latest data indicate that investment expenditure was zero, while it was 3 
per cent or less in Burundi, Madagascar and Malawi. This indicates that budgets are not 
prioritizing critical inputs that ensure all students have access to quality education services, 
including classrooms, chairs, desks, didactic materials and computers, which are supported 
by capital spending. As discussed in Chapter 2, this should be viewed as a serious concern 
given the current state of most education systems and the 16 million new students that must 
be absorbed each year (or 200 million new learners between 2019 and 2030). 
 
One area of optimism is that most governments in ESAR are executing their education 
budgets as planned. The latest available three-year period averages for 19 countries reveal 
that budget credibility rates in the education sector are strong, with an average of 95 per 
cent of approved budgets spent (Figure 7.12). For countries with data, this figure reaches 
an average of 99 per cent for recurrent budgets and 70 per cent for capital budgets. 
These trends are unsurprising. Nearly all recurrent spending goes to support the salaries 
of teachers and administrative staff, with most payments being automated. In contrast, 
capital budgets do present some implementation challenges. However, as just described, 
they represent a very small portion of total sector spending so do not have a major impact 
on overall budget credibility. Nonetheless, with recent capital budget credibility rates near 
or below 60 per cent, the figures for Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi and the United Republic of 
Tanzania are concerning. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.11. Economic classification of government expenditure on 
education in select ESAR countries, 2017 or latest available 
(as % of total government expenditure on education) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on UNICEF budget briefs, PERs, PEFAs and World Bank BOOST databases published since 2016. 
Note: Data unavailable for Eritrea and Somalia. 
   
 
 
    
 
  
 
Figure 7.12. Education budget credibility rates in ESAR countries, latest available 3-year 
period averages (actual expenditure as % of approved allocation) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on UNICEF budget briefs, PERs, PEFAs and World Bank BOOST databases published since 2016. 
Note: Data unavailable for Eritrea and Somalia. 
 
7.3 Water and sanitation spending 
 
Before discussing spending trends for water and sanitation, it is important to understand 
the limitations of existing budget information. Government Spending Watch has made 
laborious efforts to collect and analyse spending data in 78 LICs and LMICs, which capture 
most sectors for fiscal years 2015-17.83 When assessing reporting practices, they find that water 
and sanitation is the worst sector in terms of transparency and data availability, with only around 
half the countries providing some information. Even where data are available, many 
complications arise. For instance, core water and sanitation spending is usually spread across 
multiple ministries/departments/agencies (agriculture, education, energy, health, 
infrastructure/public works, water, etc.), while other important items are often hidden inside 
ministries/departments/agencies whose mandates extend far beyond these areas. Another 
important consideration is that data on actual water and sanitation expenditure is rarely 
available, so the following analysis is restricted to approved allocations (or planned spending). 
 
Data limitations aside, the water and sanitation sector does not appear to be an investment 
priority in most countries in ESAR. Based on the methodology applied by Government 
Spending Watch to identify sector-specific budget information for 13 ESAR countries,84 an 
average of 2.6 per cent of national budgets are allocated to the sector (Figure 7.13). This 
indicator varies from less than 1 per cent in South Sudan and Zambia to more than 6 per 
cent in Ethiopia and close to 8 per cent in Lesotho. 
 
83 For detailed information, see the Government Spending Watch website (www.governmentspendingwatch.org). 
84 According to Government Spending Watch, water and sanitation budget information collected generally captures 
provision of water supply (including regulatory bodies) along with waste water management. Irrigation expenditure tends 
to be classified as agriculture, but there may be cases in which it is not possible to separate this from water budgets. 
Water resource management, such as large dams and other infrastructure projects, is also excluded as the primary 
objective is usually producing energy rather than providing safe drinking water. Exact definitions are available at: <www. 
governmentspendingwatch.org/definitions-and-sources>. 
 
  
 
Figure 7.13. Budget allocations to water and sanitation in select ESAR countries 
2015-17 period averages (as % of total approved allocations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Government Spending Watch (2019). 
Note: Limited data availability. 
 
 
Figure 7.14. Budget allocations to water and sanitation in select ESAR countries, 2015-
17 period averages (as % of GDP) 
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Source: Government Spending Watch (2019). 
Note: Limited data availability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Levels of investments in water and sanitation also appear gravely inadequate in the region. 
Based on the latest three-year averages for 13 countries that have data, average total 
allocations to the sector amounted to 0.8 per cent of GDP (Figure 7.14). Madagascar, Malawi, 
South Sudan and Zambia allocated less than 0.3 per cent of GDP as an annual average, while 
Ethiopia and Mozambique allocated just over 1.1 per cent and Lesotho 3.6 per cent of GDP. 
 
At the same time, few governments appear to be meeting the spending target for sanitation 
and hygiene. In 2015, all governments in Africa signed the N’gor Declaration, where they 
promised to consistently increase annual investments in sanitation and hygiene to reach a 
minimum of 0.5% GDP by 2020.85 Tracking progress against this benchmark is very difficult 
as budget information on hygiene is available only in exceptional circumstances, while many 
governments also face difficulties reporting on sanitation. Nonetheless, making the very 
unrealistic assumption that spending on water is a good proxy for sanitation – recognizing 
that water almost always receives the lion’s share of WASH sector allocations and hygiene 
the smallest – it is possible to offer a very broad picture of performance against the target. 
Even when including water together with sanitation rather than hygiene, only 7 of the 13 
countries would meet the spending target (see also Figure 7.14). 
 
Water and sanitation investment levels are even more dire when looking at per capita 
trends. On average, the 13 countries with data allocated an amount equivalent to less than 
US$6 per person over the 2015-17 period (Figure 7.15). However, removing Lesotho, which 
is the best performer, the average falls to only around $3.50 per person. Malawi and South 
Sudan allocated around US$0.20 on a per capita basis over the 2015-17 period, on average, 
with Madagascar also particularly low at around US$0.40 per person. 
 
 
85 This included the same target as the previous agreement: the eThekwini Declaration (2008). 
 
Figure 7.15. Per capita budget allocations to water and sanitation in 
select ESAR countries, 2015-17 period averages (in constant US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Government Spending Watch (2019). 
Note: Limited data availability. 
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Figure 7.16. Economic classification of government expenditure on water and 
sanitation in select ESAR countries, 2017 (as % of total government 
expenditure on water and sanitation) 
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Source: Government Spending Watch (2019). 
Note: Limited data availability. 
 
 
In terms of budget design, water and sanitation spending is heavily skewed toward capital 
items. In the nine countries with data available in fiscal year 2017, capital budgets received 82 
per cent of total allocations to the sector (Figure 7.16). In Mozambique, recurrent allocations 
were close to zero, with five countries hovering around 90 per cent capital investment. Malawi 
and Uganda, in contrast, managed a much more even balance. This trend is particularly 
troubling given the widespread reporting in the region of malfunctioning or non-operational 
water systems, including rural hand pumps, a trend that is commonly attributed to a lack of 
recurrent funding for operation and maintenance (O&M) services.86 
The impact of water and sanitation budgets is further undermined by very low credibility. 
This information is difficult to come by, but data for six countries can be obtained from 
various public finance tools and databases to offer some very preliminary insights on 
budget implementation. Taking the latest three-year period averages, where available, 
the overall budget credibility rate for water and sanitation was 60 per cent, on average 
(Figure 7.17). This is much worse than the rates for health and education discussed earlier. 
Even within this limited sample, the variance is significant, from 30 per cent in Tanzania to 
84 per cent in Ethiopia. Based on disaggregated information from four countries, capital 
budget credibility rates are significantly lower than those for recurrent budgets (52 versus 
83 per cent, on average). This trend is, at least, partly explained by procurement challenges 
alongside significant donor funding for water and sanitation investment projects, which 
often require different administrative and reporting procedures and their own disbursement 
delays thus affecting overall credibility.87 
 
 
 
86 Boateng, N. (2015). Key Policy Challenges and Opportunities for Improving Service Delivery in WASH in Africa. Pretoria: 
Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI); and World Bank (2017). Easing the Transition to Commercial Finance 
for Sustainable Water and Sanitation. Washington, DC. 
87 WHO and UN-Water (2017). Financing Universal WASH under the SDGs: GLAAS 2017 Report. Geneva. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7.17. Water and sanitation budget credibility rates in select ESAR countries, latest 
available 3-year period averages (actual expenditure as % of approved allocation) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on 2018 WASH budget briefs for Kenya, Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania; 2017 WASH 
budget brief for Mozambique; and 2017 PER of water for Ethiopia. 
Note: Limited data availability. 
 
 
7.4 Social protection spending 
 
Although government reporting practices on social protection budgets are generally 
stronger than on water and sanitation, there are similar measurement and comparison 
issues. As in water and sanitation, social protection interventions are commonly spread 
across many ministries/departments/agencies, such as those responsible for providing 
services related to agriculture, children and families, health, education, the labour market 
and social protection (or welfare or development). The diverse operational arrangements 
make it difficult to delineate concrete budget borders around the social protection system, 
which also hampers aggregation processes to arrive at total estimates for the sector. Cross-
country comparisons are made even problematic by the fact that few governments apply the 
same definition of the social protection sector. Despite these complexities, Government 
Spending Watch attempted to harmonize social protection definitions and analyse 
allocations, like its work on water and sanitation. In its classification, allocations to social 
transfers, employment programmes targeted to the poor, food security programmes and 
other non-contributory social security schemes are included as social protection spending, 
while contributory schemes, such as civil service pensions, as well as items that are 
disbursed through other sectors (such as agriculture and health) are not.88 
 
When applying a pro-poor, harmonized definition, social protection emerges as a very 
low investment priority in the region. On average, social protection received less than 3 
per cent of total budget allocations based on the 2015-17 period averages of 14 ESAR 
countries with recent data (Figure 7.18).89 However, six governments, or nearly half the 
 
88 For exact definitions, see: <www.governmentspendingwatch.org/definitions-and-sources>. 
89 It is important to recognize that several ESAR countries that perform better in terms of social protection investments are not 
included in the sample, in particular Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia. Given the very small sizes of their populations, their omission 
  
 
Figure 7.18. Budget allocations to social protection in select ESAR countries, 2015-
17 period averages (as % of total approved allocations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Government Spending Watch (2019). 
Note: Limited data availability. 
 
sample, allocated less than 1 per cent of their national budgets to social protection. This 
included Burundi, Ethiopia, Madagascar, South Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe. South 
Africa emerged as the regional leader, having devoted more than 12 per cent of national 
allocations to social protection in recent years. 
 
The levels of investments in social protection are also quite low in ESAR, although there 
is a significant difference across income groups. For the 14 countries that have recent data, 
the average allocations to the sector amounted to 0.8 per cent of GDP during fiscal years 
2015-17 (Figure 7.19). This is exactly 50 per cent below the World Bank’s estimate for social 
protection allocations among all developing countries, which is 1.6 per cent of GDP.90 World 
Bank also assesses social protection spending levels by income groups. Here, LICs allocate 
an amount equivalent to 1.5 per cent of GDP, on average, with LMICs at 1.6 per cent, UMICs 
at 1.9 per cent and high-income countries at 2.9 per cent of GDP. When applied to ESAR, 
only 3 of the 14 countries with figures outperform their income group average spending 
benchmarks in recent fiscal years. These were Mozambique (2.2 versus 1.5 per cent of 
GDP), Angola (2.2 versus 1.6 per cent of GDP) and South Africa (3.5 versus 1.9 per cent). 
 
Levels of investments in social protection are further concerning when looking at per capita 
values. Again, taking the same sample of 14 countries, social protection allocations during 
fiscal years 2015-17 amounted to US$15 per capita, on average (Figure 7.20). However, if 
removing South Africa and its impressive US$139 per person of social protection allocations 
in recent years, the regional average falls to just US$5 per capita. The disparities across 
country income groups are particularly striking. For the LICs, average allocations to social 
protection over the 2015-17 period barely surpassed US$1 per capita, on average, 
 
does not heavily skew the overall regional investment patterns indicated by the 14 countries tracked by Government Spending Watch. 
However, it does underrepresent the level of government support for the social protection agenda in the region. 
90 World Bank (2015). The State of Social Safety Nets 2015. Washington, DC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7.19. Budget allocations to social protection in select ESAR countries and 
income group average investment levels, 2015-17 period averages (as % of GDP) 
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Sources: Government Spending Watch (2019) for social protection budget allocations; average levels of social protection investments by 
country income groups based on World Bank (2015). The State of Social Safety Nets. Washington, DC. 
Note: Limited data availability. 
 
 
Figure 7.20. Per capita budgetary allocations to social protection in select ESAR 
countries, 2015-17 period averages (in constant US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Government Spending Watch (2019). 
Note: Limited data availability. 
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Figure 7.21. Social protection budget credibility rates in select ESAR countries, latest 
available 3-year period averages (actual expenditure as % of approved allocation) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on 2017 and 2018 social protection budget briefs for Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Namibia Mozambique and Rwanda; Government Spending Watch for Ethiopia and South Africa. 
Note: Limited data availability. 
 
 
with seven countries investing less than US$0.50 per person, including Malawi (US$0.44), 
Burundi, Ethiopia and Uganda (around US$0.29), South Sudan (US$0.19), Madagascar 
(US$0.05) and Zimbabwe (US$0.01). The four LMICs fared considerably better, averaging 
US$14 per person. And as already mentioned, South Africa, the only UMIC in ESAR with data, 
was in a league of its own. 
 
With regard to the credibility of social protection budgets, the sector performs moderately 
well but has ample room for improvement. Of the nine countries that have recent data, the 
average overall budget credibility rate for the sector was 85 per cent, based on the latest 
three-year period averages, where available (Figure 7.21). Credibility rates were below 80 
per cent in just two countries (Madagascar and Malawi). On the other hand, nearly 100 per 
cent of the approved budget for social protection was spent in Namibia and South Africa. 
Information on the type of expenditure is scarce, but for three countries (Ethiopia, Namibia 
and South Africa), the credibility of recurrent social protection budgets was markedly better 
than capital budgets (103 versus 76 per cent, on average). 
 
7.5 Total social sector spending 
 
Having looked at four core social sectors separately,91 it is important to bring them 
together as best as possible. The aggregation process is inherently difficult given the data 
limitations. However, by selecting a common base year, merging various data sources and 
bearing the many caveats in mind, it is possible to present a bird’s eye view of the priority, 
levels, design and credibility of social sector budgets in ESAR. 
 
 
91 Note that other critical sectors and sub-sectors that are critical to child well-being (e.g. child protection, HIV/AIDS, 
nutrition and sanitation) are not reflected due to difficulties in accessing cross-country comparable budget data. 
 Starting with budget priority, social sector expenditure accounts for close to a third of total 
government expenditure as a crude regional average. Thirteen countries have information 
on actual expenditure and approved allocations for all four social sectors in fiscal year 
2015, which allows for general trend analysis, all caveats considered. When reviewing this 
sample, four core social sectors benefitted from an average of 32.5 per cent of national 
budgets (Figure 7.22). Interestingly, there is little difference when comparing across income 
groups, with the five LMICs giving slightly more budget priority to the social sectors than 
the eight LICs (33.9 versus 31.7 per cent, on average). South Sudan had the lowest overall 
budget priority for the social sectors in the sample (less than 10 per cent), followed by two 
LMICs, Angola and Zambia, at around 20 per cent. In Ethiopia (LIC) and Lesotho (LMIC), 
around half of total expenditure was directed to these social sectors. 
 
Within the social sectors, education benefits from the lion’s share of expenditure, with 
very limited support for water and sanitation or social protection. Based on the sample 
average for fiscal year 2015, education accounted for more than 50 per cent of total social 
sector expenditure, followed by health, at just over a third (Figure 7.23). At around 7 per cent 
of total social sector expenditure, on average, social protection comes out just slightly ahead 
of water and sanitation (just above 6 per cent, on average). In terms of income groups, 
education receives a much higher share of total social sector expenditure in LICs than in 
LMICs based on the sample (54 versus 45 per cent, respectively). The opposite is true for 
social protection, with LMICs devoting around 11 per cent of all social sector expenditure to 
social protection compared to 5 per cent in LICs. For health and water and sanitation, only 
minimal differences are observed across income groups. 
 
In terms of investment levels, social sector expenditure amounts to close to 10 per cent of 
GDP as a very rough regional approximation. Building on the same sample of 13 countries 
that have complete and comparable data for fiscal year 2015, total social sector expenditure 
 
Figure 7.22. Social sector expenditure* in select ESAR countries, 2015 (as % of total expenditure) 
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Education Health Water and sanitation Social protection 
 
Sources: WHO Global Health Expenditure Database for health, UNESCO Institute for Statistics for education, and Government Spending 
Watch for water and sanitation as well as social protection. 
* Data for water and sanitation are approved allocations and not actual expenditure as in the other categories. 
Notes: Limited data availability; to maximize the sample, additional data points were obtained from UNICEF Zimbabwe (2018) WASH 
budget brief and UNICEF Lesotho (2018) social protection budget brief. 
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Figure 7.23. Composition of social sector expenditure* in select 
ESAR countries, 2015 (as % of total social sector expenditure) 
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Sources: WHO Global Health Expenditure Database for health, UNESCO Institute for Statistics for education, and Government Spending 
Watch for water and sanitation as well as social protection. 
* Data for water and sanitation are approved allocations and not actual expenditure as in the other categories. 
Notes: Limited data availability; to maximize the sample, additional data points were obtained from UNICEF Zimbabwe (2018) WASH 
budget brief and UNICEF Lesotho (2018) social protection budget brief. 
 
 
Figure 7.24. Social sector expenditure* in select ESAR countries, 2015 (as % of GDP) 
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Sources: WHO Global Health Expenditure Database for health, UNESCO Institute for Statistics for education, Government Spending 
Watch for water and sanitation as well as social protection, and IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019) for GDP. 
* Data for water and sanitation are approved allocations and not actual expenditure as in the other categories. 
Notes: Limited data availability; to maximize the sample, additional data points were obtained from UNICEF Zimbabwe (2018) WASH 
budget brief and UNICEF Lesotho (2018) social protection budget brief. 
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 amounted to 9.5 per cent of GDP, on average (Figure 7.24). Unlike budget priority, there is 
a major difference when looking across income groups. Whereas LMIC countries spent 
an equivalent of 12 per cent of GDP on social sectors, on average, the average was 8 per 
cent for the LICs in the sample. Here, education continued to receive the largest funding, 
at around 5 per cent of GDP, on average, with health averaging 3.2 per cent of GDP. Water 
and sanitation, along with social protection, were far behind, at around 0.7 per cent of GDP 
on average. Under this metric, expenditure on education and health in LMICs was around 
1.3 per cent of GDP higher than in LICs, on average. The same trend is observed for levels 
of funding for water and sanitation and social protection, which were about 0.7 per cent 
higher in LMICs than in LICs, on average. 
 
Even greater investment disparities are evident when looking at per capita social sector 
expenditure trends in the region. This analysis again uses the same sample of countries 
but converts spending in each social sector into international dollars using PPP exchange 
rates92 and then divides the amount by the size of the population to arrive at comparable per 
capita spending estimates. According to this metric, average social sector spending per 
capita amounted to current international US$324 PPP in fiscal year 2015 (Figure 7.25). 
However, the difference across income groups is staggering. On average, per capita social 
sector investment was nearly five-fold more in LMICs than in MICs (US$630 versus 
US$132). To further underscore the magnitude of variance across the region, Eswatini 
 
92 By converting the spending amounts based on an exchange rate that accounts for price differences across countries, 
rather than using market-based exchange rates which mainly reflect the prices of the tradable sector, this allows for a 
more accurate depiction of actual spending power in countries and hence a more realistic comparison across countries. To 
illustrate the significant differences based on these alternative methodologies, the regional average value of per capita social 
sector spending under PPP exchange rates in fiscal year 2015 amounted to current international US$324 versus US$131 
under market exchange rates. 
 
 
Figure 7.25. Per capita social sector expenditure* in select 
ESAR countries, 2015 (in PPP, current international US$) 
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Education Health WASH Social protection 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WHO Global Health Expenditure Database for health, UNESCO Institute for Statistics for education, 
Government Spending Watch for water and sanitation as well as social protection, and IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019) 
for GDP and total population. 
* Data for water and sanitation are approved allocations and not actual expenditure as in the other categories. 
Notes: Limited data availability; to maximize the sample, additional data points were obtained from UNICEF Zimbabwe (2018) WASH 
budget brief and UNICEF Lesotho (2018) social protection budget brief. 
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 spent 23 times more than Madagascar in 2015. The differences are particularly acute for 
low budget priority areas, with LMICs spending more than six times as much on water and 
sanitation and more than eight times as much on social protection on a per capita basis 
than LICs, on average. One of the bigger alarm bells is the very low levels of investments 
observed in the group of LICs. On average, those countries invested a meagre US$7 per 
capita (in PPP, current international US$) in the water and sanitation and social protection 
sectors, compared to around US$50 per capita in the group of LMICs. 
 
Turning to the design of social sector budgets, severe imbalances are evident when 
comparing available information on recurrent and capital spending in the region. For 
this analysis, the samples are limited to 14 countries for health and education and nine 
countries for water and sanitation and social protection, with most information derived from 
fiscal years 2016 and 2017 (Figure 7.26). The eclectic database creates obvious 
comparability issues, but nonetheless offers some very initial insights on the design of social 
sector budgets in the region. If taking the average values of the four sectors, 85 per cent of 
recent spending supported recurrent items with 15 per cent on capital items. Social 
protection emerges as the sector with the highest portion of capital budgets (29 per cent, on 
average), which is indeed puzzling,93 followed by water and sanitation (18 per cent, on 
average). In contrast, health and education budgets are dominated by recurrent spending, 
at 96 and 92 per cent, respectively, on average. 
 
Lastly, an overview of available budget credibility rates across the social sectors indicates 
very poor regional performance, especially for capital spending. This sample is the most 
restricted and varied, as it relies on recent information from a wide variety of public finance 
 
93 Although it was not possible to confirm the spending items that were classified under the capital budget by Government 
Spending Watch, a likely explanation is that donor and development partner funding may have been classified as capital 
irrespective of its spending purpose, thus accounting for the large sharing of spending in the sample. 
 
 
Figure 7.26. Economic classification of social sector expenditure* in ESAR, 2017 or 
latest available (as % of total social sector expenditure, regional averages) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on WHO Global Health Expenditure Database for health, UNESCO Institute for Statistics for education, 
and Government Spending Watch for water and sanitation as well as social protection. 
* Data for water and sanitation are approved allocations and not actual expenditure as in the other categories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 tools, thereby requiring even greater interpretative caution. Keeping the limitations in mind, 
a back-of-the-envelope estimate is that around 80 per cent of total approved social sector 
budgets are spent by the end of the fiscal year, on average (Figure 7.27). At under 60 per 
cent, on average, water and sanitation has the lowest overall credibility by a wide margin, 
with health and social protection performing reasonably well in the 85 per cent range. 
Education, in contrast, performs the best, with an average budget credibility rate of 95 per 
cent. There is little doubt that capital budgets are the main credibility bottleneck, with around 
a third of planned capital spending in the social sectors going unspent by the end of the fiscal 
year, on average. Here, water and sanitation continues at the bottom, with an average capital 
budget credibility rate of around 50 per cent, but even health and education are 
unimpressive, at 70 per cent, on average. 
 
7.6 Shifting budget priorities and the impact on social sector spending 
 
Investments in social sectors are often constrained by political decisions to prioritize budget 
allocations to other sectors, like the military. To highlight the potential of budget reprioritization, 
the military is commonly used as an example for two reasons. The first is the availability of 
data across countries.94 Second, many governments spend a significant amount of resources 
on national defence in the absence of conflict. This certainly applies to ESAR, where only 6 
out of 21 countries have been directly involved in a conflict since 2008 or face an imminent 
external threat,95 meaning few countries can justify inflated military budgets. 
 
94 Military spending data for nearly all countries is compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
However, it is important to recognize that this information is not as credible as information on health and education spending 
due to state secrecy and the reluctance of some governments to share data. 
95 These include Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda, according to Uppsala Conflict Data 
Programme Armed Conflict Dataset version 18.1 (available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/). 
Figure 7.27. Social sector budget credibility rates in ESAR, 2017 or latest available 
(actual expenditure as % of approved allocation, three-year period regional averages) 
 
110% 
 
100% 
90% 
 
80% 
 
70% 
 
60%    
 
50%    
 
40% 
 
 
Water and sanitation Social protection Health Education Average 
 
Recurrent Capital Total 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UNICEF budget briefs, PERs, PEFAs, BOOST databases and Government Spending Watch 
published since 2016; see Figures 6, 12, 17 and 21 presented earlier in this chapter for exact sources. 
 By reallocating resources away from the military, most countries in ESAR could easily 
achieve core social sector spending benchmarks. For instance, if all military expenditure 
had been redirected to the health sector in the most recent year of data availability, 
health expenditure as a share of total expenditure would have increased from 10.6 to 17.9 
per cent, as a regional average (Figure 7.28). This means that the number of governments 
that achieved the Abuja Declaration target (15 per cent of the budget for health) would 
have jumped from 3 to 15. Applying the same approach to education shows that 14 
countries would have fulfilled their commitment to the Incheon Declaration (20 per cent 
of the budget for education), up from 5 (Figure 7.29). Here, total education expenditure 
would have reached 22.5 per cent of total expenditure, on average, compared to 15.2 per 
cent. 
 
Beyond achieving basic financial targets, repurposing military budgets could also 
significantly boost levels of investment in basic social services. For example, if all military 
expenditure had been invested in the health and education sectors in 2015, core social 
sector investments would have climbed by an average of US$50 on a per capita basis, 
equating to a 26 per cent increase on actual levels (Figure 7.30). In some contexts, the 
impacts could be transformational. In South Sudan, Angola and Botswana, this approach 
would have increased per capita social sector investments by around US$100, US$140 
and US$175 respectively, while in Namibia per capita levels would have jumped by more 
than US$230. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.28. Government expenditure on military and health in ESAR 
countries, 2017 (or latest available) (as % of total expenditure) 
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Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditure Database for data on military expenditure and WHO 
Global Health Expenditure Database for data on health expenditure. 
* Based on Federal Government of Somalia (2018). Citizen’s Guide to the 2018 Budget. 
** Based on Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques et Demographiques (INSEED) (2017). Memoire Budgetaire 
Global 2016/17. 
Note: Data unavailable for Eritrea. 
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Figure 7.29. Government expenditure on military and education in ESAR 
countries, 2017 (or latest available) (as % of total expenditure) 
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Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditure Database for data on military expenditure and UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics for data on education expenditure. 
* Based on Federal Government of Somalia (2018). Citizen’s Guide to the 2018 Budget. 
** Based on Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques et Demographiques (INSEED) (2017). Memoire Budgetaire 
Global 2016/17. 
Note: Data unavailable for Eritrea. 
 
 
Figure 7.30. Per capita impact of reallocating military budgets to the education and health 
sectors in ESAR countries, 2015 (or latest available) (increase in current US$ and as %) 
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in per capita current US$ (left axis) as a % (right axis) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditure Database for data on 
military expenditure, WHO Global Health Expenditure Database for data on health expenditure, UNESCO Institute for Statistics for data 
on education expenditure, and UN DESA World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision for population data. 
Note: Data unavailable for Comoros, Eritrea and Somalia. 
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 7.7 Takeaways 
 
Key trends 
 
o Few governments in the region are meeting their financial commitments to the social 
sectors, either in budget priority or in investment levels. 
o Even where social sectors are afforded a large share of the budget, the low revenue 
base makes it impossible for most governments to achieve minimum spending levels. 
This underscores the need for greater domestic resource mobilization efforts as well 
as more ODA to ensure that the most vulnerable populations and children are reached 
by essential social services. 
o The design of social sector budgets tends to favour tertiary services while neglecting 
basic and catalytic investment, including for primary healthcare, pre-primary education, 
social protection and WASH services. 
o Low budget credibility is another critical investment constraint, especially for capital 
items, indicating that resources are not released to social sector line ministries as 
planned and/or available funding is not fully utilized by the end of the fiscal year. This 
is a particular concern for health, social protection, and water and sanitation budgets. 
o Many governments could make significant progress toward closing social sector 
investment gaps by removing budget execution bottlenecks so that available funding is 
fully and effectively spent, as well as by reallocating resources from non-essential areas, 
like the military. 
 
Implications for children 
 
o Given that most households in the region have very limited incomes, child well-being 
heavily depends on the effective provision of public goods and services, and hence 
government budgets. 
o The overall low levels of social sector investment in ESAR means that children affected 
by multi-dimensional poverty are not getting the support they need, and there is a real 
risk that existing support will progressively worsen as systems are forced to cope with 
the rapidly increasing number of children. 
o Beyond the total volume of social sector investments, child well-being is directly 
affected by the design and execution of budgets. Here, one very explicit threat is the 
under-prioritization of capital budgets, including for things like expanding water and 
sanitation systems, building classrooms and health facilities, and procuring teaching 
materials and medical equipment. This is especially distressing when viewed in the 
regional context of low coverage rates alongside the continuous rise in demand for 
basic social services.

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The macroeconomy is not working well for most children in ESAR. Widespread poverty 
is the starting point. Around 40 per cent of persons living in the region are affected by 
extreme poverty (less than US$1.90 per day in PPP, 2011 international US$), which rises 
to more than four out of every five persons if using a more realistic benchmark, such as 
the US$5.50/day poverty line. This means that most families cannot adequately provide 
for themselves or their children. And while there has been undeniable progress toward 
poverty alleviation and improving the lives of children in recent decades, many basic 
indicators simply have not kept pace with population growth. The enormity of the 
challenges is well captured by the numbers: 
 
o Around a million children under the age of five die from preventable causes every 
year, most during the first month of life; 
•  
 
o More than 27 million children under the age of five are stunted; 
 
o 36 million school-age children are not attending primary or secondary school; 
 
o Around 100 million persons practice open defecation, most of whom are children; and 
o Close to 300 million lack access to safe water sources, again largely affecting children. 
 
Social sector service delivery systems continue to act as a main barrier to faster progress. 
The severe shortage of healthcare personnel means that around seven million births 
take place under dangerous conditions, exposing newborns and their mothers to life- 
threatening risks, while nearly half of the children aged 0-14 affected by HIV continue to 
lack access to life-saving ART. Where children are healthy and well-nourished enough to 
go to school, they often share classrooms with 50 or more other pupils, such as in 
primary schools in Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, South 
Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. And for the 5 per cent or so of 
students that complete secondary school without unreasonable delay, an even smaller 
percentage are equipped with the level of competencies demanded by jobs in the formal 
sector. Moreover, barely one in ten persons in the region is supported by a social safety 
net programme, and many of these are unreliable and almost always insufficient to 
effectively help families transition through difficult times or overcome existing barriers to 
access social services. In such a context, it is unsurprising that around two in every three 
children suffer from multi-dimensional poverty. 
Will macroeconomic forces and social sector investments catalyse sustainable change 
for children or decelerate progress? Optimism is hard to come by. Heavy clouds hang 
over economies, job markets, price indices, the fiscal balance and social sector budgets 
across the region. However, economic growth could outperform expectations… Labour 
markets could rapidly expand and create formal sector opportunities for young and adult 
workers… Price levels could permanently stabilize… Domestic resource mobilization and 
other financing efforts could produce strong returns… And social sector investment could 
suddenly grow in size and impact… Each of these potential trajectories is summarized 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8.1 The downside 
 
Economic growth is not nearly fast enough to propel incomes and poverty alleviation on 
a meaningful scale. Once factoring in expected price and demographic changes, real per 
capita GDP growth in ESAR is projected to be around 1.3 per cent in 2019 and 2020. This 
means that it would take the region around 55 years to double its income, on average, 
although this is a far cry for the seven the countries that are expected to experience negative 
growth on a real per capita basis during 2019-20. And while there are important exceptions, 
including Ethiopia and Rwanda, they are few and far between. Pervasive income inequality 
acts as an additional drag on the economic prospects of most of the region. Given the direct 
impact of economic growth on household income, child health outcomes, educational 
achievement and the availability of social services, among many others, the current 
trajectory does not bode well for most children in ESAR. 
 
Labour markets also fall far short of providing the quality jobs needed by parents and 
young workers to improve their lives and the lives of children. As a regional average, 
around three out of four jobs are in the informal sector, mostly in agriculture. Here, pay 
is often insufficient and erratic to help workers and their families escape poverty: this has 
a direct impact on child well-being as well as their incentives to finish schooling. Given 
that ESAR has one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, the overall lack of 
job opportunities also directly affects child well-being. This is especially problematic in 
southern Africa, where many countries are confronting unemployment rates in excess of 
20 per cent and dealing with rising risks of economic, political and social instability. And 
young workers are hardest hit. Unemployment rates among the 15-24 year old population 
are almost double the adult rates in the region, with around 6 million young job seekers 
projected to be unable to find work in 2019. This has already inflicted severe “wage scars” 
on a generation of young workers, irreversibly damaging their potential earnings. As 
labour markets are forced to absorb 12 million new job seekers each year, demographic 
forces will only exacerbate the prevailing employment woes. 
 
In addition, rising prices are negatively influencing real economic growth, government 
investment and household welfare. Over the past decade, most countries have experienced 
extensive bouts of inflation and remain heavily exposed to risks from the printing press (to 
cover budget deficits), global commodity price movements and supply chain disruptions due 
to natural events. In 2019, the region houses some of the highest inflation rates in the world, 
with several countries facing dangerous levels of volatility, including Angola, South Sudan, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. As already discussed, rising prices are hampering the real output of 
many economies. On the fiscal front, the impact of government budgets is being muted by 
inflation in far too many places: this is particularly problematic for social transfer values and 
hence direct support to children. And at the household level, rising prices erode disposable 
income, while food inflation runs substantially higher than general inflation in ESAR. These 
trends are a direct threat to the nutritional intake of children, whose well-being is further 
endangered by other household coping mechanisms, which can include being forced to work, 
having less time to study or dropping out of school altogether, among many others. 
 
Small revenue bases, continuous budget deficits, high debt and the changing ODA 
landscape further limit government spending on essential children’s services. As an 
average, government budgets in ESAR are equivalent to around 27 per cent of GDP, which 
fares moderately well relative to other regions. However, budgets are constrained by the 
small size of formal economies in most countries. This is especially profound in places like 
Burundi, Madagascar, Malawi and South Sudan, where total government expenditure on a 
per capita basis is less than or barely exceeds US$100, making it impossible to adequately 
fund services for children. To complement domestic revenue, borrowing has mushroomed 
across the region, with budget deficits nearly universal in 2019. In addition to the rapid 
rise of debt service payments, which crowds out available funding for social sectors, debt 
 sustainability concerns are elevating across the region: four countries are already in debt 
distress, with many others just one unexpected shock away. At the same time, although 
ODA serves as an important financing source for most governments, flows are heavily 
concentrated in a sub-set of countries, while its relative importance vis-à-vis domestic 
revenue is universally waning. As many ESAR countries are expected to reach middle 
income status in the near future, ODA eligibility will also become increasingly restricted. 
 
Finally, the current levels, design and performance of social sector budgets prevent 
systems from delivering the services demanded by children and their families. As a 
starting point, few governments in the region are meeting their financial commitments to 
core social sectors, either in budget priority or in investment levels. And even where social 
sectors are afforded a large share of the budget, the low revenue base makes it impossible 
to achieve minimum spending levels. This should be an alarm bell in a context where 
insufficient incomes force families to rely on public goods and services to ensure child 
well-being. Social sector budget structures are also worrisome, as they commonly favour 
tertiary services while neglecting the primary services that are direly needed and gravely 
underfunded. Low budget credibility, especially for capital (or development) investment, 
acts as yet another barrier to reaching children. 
 
8.2 The upside 
 
Economic growth could outperform expectations. The recent discovery of large national 
resource deposits could act as one possible catalyst for the region. In countries like Kenya, 
Mozambique, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, if governments can expedite the 
development of fields and exports, economic growth could surge. Similarly, if global 
commodity prices edge upwards and remain high, the many resource-intensive economies 
in the region could get an unexpected growth thrust. As the African Continental Free Trade 
Area comes into force, a swift move toward regional economic integration could also expand 
economic opportunities, while global trade patterns and foreign direct investment flows are 
other possible wild cards. At the same time, if governments could enhance income 
redistribution efforts through better taxation and social protection measures, they could lift 
the incomes of the most vulnerable households and their children, and further help engender 
bigger and increasingly sustainable economic growth trajectories. 
 
The labour market outlook could equally surprise. Countries in ESAR have, for the most 
part, initiated development pathways from mainly agricultural-based economies to 
service-oriented economies, and services are now the largest contributor to GDP in the 
region. There are certainly questions surrounding the long-term potential of a development 
approach that largely skips the manufacturing base used by many other countries to 
catapult economic growth and employment. However, if service sector jobs more closely 
accompany the rapidly-growing service sectors in the formal economy, opportunities 
could abound. Of course, investment in education systems and ensuring smooth school- 
to-work transitions are indispensable, as is the development and adaptation of productive 
technologies alongside the adoption of more business-friendly regulations that encourage 
entrepreneurship and small- and medium-size enterprises in the formal sector. Concerted 
efforts to scale up more robust social protection measures could also provide better 
protection to workers and their families from unexpected job losses or shocks, and go a 
long way to supporting child well-being. 
 
Price stabilization could also be the new norm. There are a few exceptions, but the region 
as a whole is already headed down a pathway of lower inflationary pressures. The near-term 
outlook for global commodity prices should help limit the forces of cost-push inflation, while 
more prudent monetary and fiscal policies could usher in a new era of sound economic 
management across ESAR. Since volatility peaked in 2016, food prices 
 have also stabilized in most places, with clear benefits for children. At the same time, 
greater government efforts to adjust social transfers to price indices and ensure that social 
sector budget allocations are evaluated in real terms could improve the impact of spending 
on programmes that benefit vulnerable households and children. 
 
There is even scope for new income streams to avail unprecedented funding for social 
services. The introduction of progressive forms of taxation, such as on personal and 
corporate income, financial transactions, luxury goods and property, coupled with quick and 
strong improvements in tax administrative capacity, including to minimize tax evasion and 
illicit financial flows, could help unlock vast domestic revenue flows in most countries. If 
governments – especially in LICs – can effectively convince donors that additional ODA will 
be used as intended and deliver strong value for money, they could attract more grants and 
concessional loans to support social sectors. Similarly, through prudent debt management 
and careful risk mitigation, some governments could take better advantage of new financiers 
in the region, including China, to fund social infrastructure. All governments also show 
significant potential to increase the budget priority afforded to social services, which could 
be readily achieved by shifting allocations away from non-priority sectors, such as defence. 
And lastly, rapid improvements in the design, credibility and execution of social services 
budgets could bolster actual investment levels and the impacts on children’s lives. 
 
8.3 Final takeaway 
 
The current challenges facing children in ESAR are staggering in terms of sheer numbers, 
but there is positive momentum to build from. Progress is apparent when looking at the 
average changes in the incidence rates of key indicators since 2000. For example:96 
o Extreme poverty rates have fallen by around 10 per cent (from 54.5 to 45.1 per 
cent); 
 
o Under-five mortality rates have improved by 55 per cent (from 134 to 60 deaths per 
1,000 live births); 
o Under-five stunting rates have declined by close to 10 per cent (from 44.5 to 35.1 per 
cent); 
o Net enrollment rates for primary school age children have improved by nearly 20 per 
cent (from 67.5 to 85.5 per cent); and 
o Access to basic drinking water services has increased by more than 10 per cent (from 46 
to 57.5 per cent of the total population). 
 
Whether the region can capitalize on the existing momentum depends, first and foremost, 
on promoting macroeconomic strength and predictability. This requires sustained 
economic growth, well-functioning job markets, price stability, and strong domestic 
resource mobilization and debt management capacity. While these outlooks are currently 
lacklustre and marred with uncertainty, sound policies and favorable external conditions 
could help unlock the upside. 
 
Achieving meaningful and lasting improvements in child well-being also requires boosting 
spending on social services. The ongoing population boom has vast potential to transform 
the region – for good or ill – and the outcome will be largely dictated by the investment 
choices of governments today. If budgets strategically prioritize child well-being, current 
 
96 These reflect the average change of the available sample for each indicator based on the data point closest to the year 
2000 and the latest available data point. The use of the historical data point restricted the sample in certain cases, which is 
why the average value reported here may not be identical to those presented in Chapter 2. Also note that the data sources 
are the same as those from Chapter 2. 
 and forthcoming generations will be healthier, smarter, safer and, ultimately, empowered 
to sustain economic growth and transform living standards and opportunities for 
themselves and their families. The alternative path could prove cataclysmic. If government 
investments fail to adequately prepare their fast-growing labour forces, poverty, inequality, 
crime, violence, social and political instability, out-migration and so on are likely to spiral 
out of control, squandering hope and turning the clock back on progress for children, their 
countries and the region. 
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